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“As Who They Really Are”: Expanding 
Opportunities for Transgender Athletes to 
Participate in Youth and Scholastic 
Sports 
Erin E. Buzuvis† 
Introduction 
When Caitlyn Jenner received the Arthur Ashe Award for 
Courage at the 2015 ESPYs,1 she used the opportunity of her 
highly publicized acceptance speech to focus public attention on 
“the young trans athletes who are out there,” and urged the public 
to embrace transgender athletes’ wish to participate in sports “as 
who they really are.”2  Jenner, who was once known as the “world’s 
greatest athlete,” and is today “the most famous transgender 
woman in the world,”3 has a unique platform from which to call for 
such inclusion on behalf of present and future athletes.  But 
creating such inclusive opportunities will require more than just 
the attention of a well-known transgender athlete like Jenner.  It 
will require the engagement of leaders and stakeholders in local, 
state, and national sport organizations. 
 
 †. Professor Buzuvis researches and writes about gender and discrimination 
in sport, including such topics as the interrelation of law and sports culture, 
intersecting sexual orientation and race discrimination in women's athletics, 
retaliation against coaches in collegiate women's sports, the role of interest surveys 
in Title IX compliance, participation policies for transgender and intersex athletes, 
and Title IX and competitive cheer. Additionally, she is a co -founder and 
contributor to the Title IX Blog, an interdisciplinary resource for news, legal 
developments, commentary, and scholarship about Title IX's application to 
athletics and education. Professor Buzuvis currently serves as the Director o f  the  
Center for Gender & Sexuality Studies at Western New England University School 
of Law.  She also teaches courses on administrative law, employment 
discrimination, Title IX, torts and property. Prior to joining the faculty at Western 
New England University School of Law in 2006, she clerked for Judge Thomas 
Ambro of the Third Circuit and practiced law at Goodwin Procter in Boston. She 
also spent time as a Visiting Professor at the University of Iowa College of Law. 
 1. The ESPYs, or “Excellence in Sports Performance Yearly Awards” present 
accolades to honor athletes for various achievements.  See ESPYs, ESPN, 
http://www.espn.com/espys/2016/ (last visited June 20, 2016). 
 2. Caitlyn Jenner, Arthur Ashe Award for Courage Recipient, Acceptance 
Speech at the 2015 ESPY Awards (July 15, 2015) (transcript available at 
http://time.com/3960279/caitlyn-jenner-full-speech-espy-espys-text-transcript/). 
 3. Katy Steinmetz, Caitlyn Jenner: The World’s Most Famous Transgender 
Woman Shines Her Spotlight on the Fight for Equality , TIME, Dec. 21, 2015, at 144,  
146. 
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This Article aims to assist the effort of inclusion by helping 
decision-makers in scholastic athletics and youth sports 
understand why and how to create inclusive policies.  This Article 
begins with an overview of policies that have already been adopted 
by interscholastic athletic associations and sport governing bodies 
that regulate youth sport programs.4  The Article then critiques 
policies that categorically exclude and otherwise impose 
limitations on transgender persons who seek to participate in 
sports in a manner consistent with their gender identities5—what 
this Article will refer to as “gender-consonant participation.”  The 
Article will then suggest ways to maximize inclusivity6 and 
conclude with a model policy that seeks to implement those 
suggestions.7 
I. Transgender Participation Policies: The Present 
Landscape 
Millions of young people in the United States play sports in 
school-run extracurricular programs or as part of non-scholastic 
youth sports organizations.8  Whether young transgender athletes 
are permitted to partake in these opportunities “as who they really 
are”9 depends on the policy of the interscholastic athletic 
association to which their school belongs, or, for non-scholastic 
activities, the policy of the national governing body of the sport in 
question.  In some contexts, policies restrict a transgender 
participant’s opportunity to participate according to anything 
other than the sex that person was assigned at birth.10  These 
policies effectively prohibit a transgender athlete from 
participating in a manner consistent with that person’s gender 
identity.11  In contrast, other policies permit transgender athletes’ 
gender-consonant participation,12 though some impose various 
limitations and exceptions to such opportunities and use different 
procedures to validate athletes’ affirmed genders.13  The 
patchwork of policies, first for interscholastic sports and then for 
 
 4. See infra Part I. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. See infra Part IV. 
 8. Bruce Kelley & Carl Carchia, “Hey, Data Data—Swing!,” ESPN (July 16, 
2013), http://espn.go.com/espn/story/_/id/9469252/hidden-demographics-youth-sport
s-espn-magazine. 
 9. Jenner, supra note 2. 
 10. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part I.A.4. 
 13. See infra Parts I.A.2, I.A.3. 
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non-scholastic youth sports, is as follows. 
A. State Interscholastic Athletic Associations 
Each state has an association of voluntary member schools 
which coordinates and regulates athletic competition and other 
activities for students of the various members.14  Their bylaws 
operate as a contract that obligates the schools, as a condition of 
membership, to comply with the association’s uniform 
requirements about matters such as the season of competition for 
various sports, the rules by which the games are played, and the 
eligibility of students to compete.15  A total of thirty-five 
associations have adopted policies addressing participation by 
transgender athletes, and these policies vary widely.16 
1.Birth Certificate Policies 
The first major difference among state athletic association 
policies is that some permit transgender students to participate 
according to their gender identity, while others limit participation 
to the sex identified on one’s birth certificate.  Gender identity is 
one’s internal sense of self as “male” or “female,” or in some cases, 
both or neither.17  Everyone has a gender identity, and, for the 
majority of people, that identity aligns with their so-called 
“biological sex.”18  One’s biological sex is determined at birth on 
the basis of factors such as chromosomes, hormones, and genital 
and other physical characteristics.19  A transgender person is, by 
definition, one whose gender identity is not consistent with the 
person’s birth-assigned sex.20  Most individuals become aware of 
their gender identity early in life.21  Therefore, a policy that limits 
 
 14. See NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, NFHS HANDBOOK 2015–16, at 
18 (2015), https://www.nfhs.org/media/1015824/2015-16-nfhs-handbook.pdf. 
 15. See id. at 20. 
 16. See infra Parts I.A.1; I.A.2.; I.A.3; I.A.4. 
 17. Understanding Gender, GENDER SPECTRUM, https://www.gender
spectrum.org/quick-links/understanding-gender/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2016) 
[hereinafter Understanding Gender]. 
 18. Many believe that gender identity also has a biological basis, so it may no t 
be accurate to use the phrase “biological sex” in contradistinction to gender 
identity.  See M. Dru Levasseur, Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating the Law to  
Reflect Modern Medical Science Is Key to Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L.  RE V .  943, 
980–89 (2015).  For this reason, this Article will use the concept of sex assigned at 
birth—also known as “natal sex”—to refer to the aspects of one’s sex, other than 
gender identity, that are unmodified by hormonal or surgical intervention. 
 19. Understanding Gender, supra note 17. 
 20. Id. 
 21. It is possible for children as young as two- and three-years-old to express 
evidence of what later might be understood as transgender identity.  STEPHANIE 
BRILL & RACHEL PEPPER, THE TRANSGENDER CHILD 61–62 (2008). 
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young people’s opportunities according to their birth-assigned sex 
necessarily precludes transgender youth from gender-consonant 
participation, that is, playing sports “as who they really are.”22 
 
 
 
States whose interscholastic athletic associations have 
adopted birth-certificate policies currently include Alabama,23 
Georgia,24 Kentucky,25 New Mexico,26 North Carolina,27 and 
Texas.28  As a legal matter, in all of these states,  transgender 
individuals can amend the sex designation on their birth 
certificates to match their gender identities.29  However, all but 
one30 of these states will only issue an amended birth certificate in 
cases where the person petitioning for the change has undergone 
genital reconstructive surgery.31  Most transgender youth are 
 
 22. Jenner, supra note 2. 
 23. ALA. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, AHSAA HANDBOOK 2015–2016 (2015), 
http://www.ahsaa.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=NpdM99yaOTs%3d&tabid=130&p
ortalid=0. 
 24. GA. HIGH SCH. ASS’N, CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS 2015–2016, at 16 (2015) , 
http://www.ghsa.net/sites/default/files/documents/Constitution/Constitution2015 -
16Complete.pdf. 
 25. KY. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2015–2016 HANDBOOK § 4, at 26 (2015) 
[hereinafter KY. POLICY], http://khsaa.org/Publications/Handbook/20152016/
20152016fullhandbook.pdf. 
 26. N.M. ACTIVITIES ASS’N, SECTION VI: ELIGIBILITY (BYLAWS), at VI-1 (2016) , 
http://www.nmact.org/file/Section_6.pdf. 
 27. See Matt Comer, New High School Athletics Gender Rule May Cause 
Discrimination, QNOTES (May 8, 2014), http://goqnotes.com/29224/new-high-school-
athletics-gender-rule-may-cause-discrimination/. 
 28. In October 2015, Texas’s University Interscholastic League’s (UIL) 
Standing Committee on Policy moved for the UIL Legislative Council to pass a 
proposed birth-certificate policy.  UNIV. INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE, REPORT OF THE 
UNIVERSITY INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL STANDING 
COMMITTEE ON POLICY 8–10 (2015), http://www.uiltexas.org/files/media/
2015_Policy_Proposals2.pdf (proposing an amendment to the UIL CONSTITUTION 
AND CONTEST RULES §§ 360, 361).  Texas superintendents approved the policy in  a 
spring 2016 referendum.  See UNIV. INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE, SPRING 2016 
REFERENDUM BALLOT 3 (2016), http://www.uiltexas.org/files/policy/2016_
spring_referendum_ballot.pdf.  The policy will become official on August 1, 2016.  
Kaih Collier, Birth Certificates To Determine Student-Athletes’ Gender, TEX. 
TRIBUNE (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/02/26/birth-
certificates-determine-student-athlete-gende/. 
 29. Comer, supra note 27. 
 30. Texas does not specifically require surgical intervention to apply for a birth 
certificate amendment.  See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 192.011(b) (West 
2015).  However, “[c]urrent case law and evidence indicates that Texas officials and 
judges are adverse to issuing the necessary court orders.”  ID Documents Center: 
Texas, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://www.transequality.org/documents/state/texas. 
 31. See ALA. CODE § 22-9A-19(d) (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-23(e) (West 
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ineligible for this intervention.32  Moreover, not even a majority of 
transgender adults elect to undergo those procedures.33  Therefore, 
in states with birth-certificate policies, transgender youth are 
effectively limited to participating in athletics according to the sex 
identified on their original birth certificates, which will not be 
consistent with their gender identities.  Notably, Kentucky’s 
interscholastic athletic association policy seems to preclude even 
the theoretical possibility of participating according to one’s 
amended birth certificate, as it tells athletes that eligibility is 
based on one’s “gender . . . assigned at birth.”34 
2. Hormone Policies 
Among the interscholastic athletic association policies that do 
permit gender-consonant participation, some differentiate 
themselves by requiring a transgender student to undergo 
hormone treatment as a condition for participation.  Typically, 
such policies are modeled on the policy of the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA), which permits transgender female 
athletes to compete on women’s teams after one year of treatment 
that suppresses endogenous male hormones, also known as 
androgens, including testosterone.35  By contrast, the NCAA policy 
permits transgender male athletes to participate on men’s teams 
without requiring hormones; but at the same time, the policy 
disqualifies them from women’s teams as soon as they commence 
hormone treatment with exogenous testosterone.36 
 
2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.121(5) (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-14-
25(D) (West 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 130A-118(b)(4) (West 2015).  The 
surgical interventions required in these states are commonly referred to as “sex 
reassignment surgery,” but this label is not consistent with the understanding of 
gender identity as the core component of sex.  Levasseur, supra note 18, at 988 
(“Transition is not altering one’s sex, but affirming one’s underlying gender 
identity.”). 
 32. See ELI COLEMAN ET AL., WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDE R HEALTH 
(WPATH), STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER,  
AND GENDER-NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 21 (2012) [hereinafter WPATH], 
http://www.wpath.org/uploaded_files/140/files/Standards%20of%20Care,%20V7%20
Full%20Book.pdf (7th version) (“Genital surgery should not be carried out 
until . . . patients reach the legal age of majority to give consent for medical 
procedures in a given country . . . .”). 
 33. JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & NAT’L GAY 
& LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 26 (2011), http://www.thetaskforce.org/
static_html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf (reporting that thirty-three 
percent of transgender survey respondents had surgically transitioned). 
 34. KY. POLICY, supra note 25, § 4, at 26. 
 35. PAT GRIFFIN & HELEN CARROLL, NCAA INCLUSION OF TRANSGENDER 
STUDENT-ATHLETES 13 (2011) [hereinafter GRIFFIN & CARROLL, NCAA INCLUSION], 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/11INCL.pdf. 
 36. The NCAA allows transgender male athletes who are taking testosterone to 
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 State athletic associations with policies similar to the 
NCAA’s include Idaho,37 Missouri,38 Oklahoma,39 Oregon,40 and 
Wisconsin.41  A hormone policy is presently under consideration in 
Nebraska.42  The policy in Ohio is similarly hormone-based, but 
uniquely provides that the hormone requirement could be waived 
in cases where the athletic association commissioner is convinced 
“by way of sound medical evidence that the transgender female 
student athlete does not possess physical (bone structure, muscle 
mass, testosterone, hormonal, etc.) or physiological advantages 
over genetic females of the same age group.”43 
3. Gender-Consonant Policies That Contain 
Exceptions and Limitations 
Several state athletic associations permit a transgender 
student’s gender-consonant athletic participation only on a case-
by-case basis.  In Arizona,44 Michigan,45 and Pennsylvania,46 a 
 
qualify for a “medical exception” for what would otherwise violate its ban on 
performance-enhancing drugs.  Id. at 12. 
 37. IDAHO HIGH SCH. ACTIVITIES ASS’N, RULES AND REGULATIONS 2015–2016, at 
87 (2015) [hereinafter IDAHO POLICY], http://www.idhsaa.org/manage/articlefiles/
56-15-16%20Rules%20and%20Regs.pdf. 
 38. MO. STATE HIGH SCH. ACTIVITIES ASS’N, 2015–2016 OFFICIAL HANDBOOK 
136 (2015) [hereinafter MO. POLICY], http://www.mshsaa.org/resources/pdf/
1516Handbook.pdf. 
 39. OKLA. SECONDARY SCH. ACTIVITIES ASS’N, BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ POLI CI ES 
2015–2016, at 82–83 (2015) [hereinafter OKLA. POLICY], 
http://www.ossaaonline.com/docs/2015-16/MiscForms/MF_2015-
16_BoardPolicies.pdf?id=7. 
 40. OR. SCH. ACTIVITIES ASS’N, 2015–2016 OREGON SCHOOL ACTIVITIES 
ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK 98 (2015) [hereinafter OR. POLICY], 
http://www.osaa.org/docs/handbooks/osaahandbook.pdf. 
 41. WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, TRANSGENDER PARTICIPATION 
POLICY 2 (2013) [hereinafter WIS. POLICY], http://media.wix.com/ugd/
2bc3fc_95ec28cdb3ee4df89ee624229b9caa48.pdf. 
 42. Margaret Reist, NSAA Advances Strict Transgender Participation Po l icy ,  
LINCOLN J. STAR (Dec. 9, 2015, 8:15 PM), http://journalstar.com/news/
local/education/nsaa-advances-strict-transgender-participation-
policy/article_48226619-7631-5cc2-8350-24329cb9c99c.html. 
 43. OHIO HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, TRANSGENDER POLICY 3 (2014), 
http://www.ohsaa.org/eligibility/TransgenderPolicy.pdf. 
 44. ARIZ. INTERSCHOLASTIC ASS’N, 2015–2016 CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS 35 
(2015), http://aiaonline.org/files/14046/2015-2016-aia-constitution-bylaws-book.pdf. 
 45. MICH. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL MEETING 6 
(2012), http://media.wix.com/ugd/2bc3fc_80d4a5e560084ce4949dcc8d7cefcff1.pdf. 
 46. PA. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2015–2016 CONSTITUTION AND BY-
LAWS 35 (2015) [hereinafter PA. POLICY], http://www.piaa.org/assets/web/
documents/Handbook%20-%20Section%20I%20-%20Constitution%20and%20By-
laws.pdf. 
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transgender student must seek the permission of school or 
association officials, depending on the policy.  These policies  
 
provide little or no criteria to guide or limit the decision-maker’s 
authority and thus allow for the possibility that a transgender 
athlete could be excluded for arbitrary reasons. 
Athletic associations in Maine47 and New Jersey48 permit 
transgender students to participate according to their gender 
identities, except in cases that threaten to compromise the safety 
or competitive balance of other athletes.  Athletic associations in 
Illinois49 and Kansas50 permit schools to disqualify a transgender 
athlete from gender-consonant participation due to “Gender 
Identity related advantages.”  Maryland’s interscholastic athletic 
association allows transgender students to participate according to 
their gender identities, rather than the sex classifications on 
students’ birth certificates or school records.51  Yet elsewhere in 
the policy, a list of “[g]uiding [p]rinciples” for school districts 
invites them to factor in “tremendous variation among individuals 
in strength, size, musculature, and ability.”52  This provision 
interjects ambiguity into the policy, as it is unclear whether 
schools may limit the athletic opportunities of transgender 
students based on officials’ impressions of transgender students’ 
strength, size, musculature, and ability. 
In Nevada53 and New York,54 athletic associations have 
 
 47. ME. PRINCIPALS’ ASS’N, 2013–2014 HANDBOOK 19 (2013) [hereinafter ME. 
POLICY], http://www.mpa.cc/images/pdfs/handbook15forwebsite.pdf. 
 48. N.J. STATE INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, WHAT’S NEW FOR 2015–2016, 
at 83–84 (2015) [hereinafter N.J. POLICY], http://www.njsiaa.org/sites/default/file s/
document/15-16%20NJSIAA%20Constitution%2C%20Bylaws%2C%20R%20%26%
20R.pdf. 
 49. ILL. HIGH SCH. ASS’N, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES, GUIDELINES AND 
POLICIES 119–20 (2015) [hereinafter ILL. POLICY], http://www.ihsa.org/
documents/forms/2015-16/IHSA%20Policies%202015-16.pdf. 
 50. KAN. STATE HIGH SCH. ACTIVITIES ASS’N, KSHAA POLICY FOR 
TRANSGENDER STUDENT PARTICIPATION 1 (2015) [hereinafter KAN. POLICY], 
http://www.kshsaa.org/Public/PDF/TransgenderPolicyRecommendations.pdf. 
 51. MD. PUB. SECONDARY SCHS. ATHLETIC ASS’N, MPSSAA TRANSGENDER 
PERSON GUIDANCE FOR PARTICIPATION IN INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETICS (2015) 
[hereinafter MD. POLICY], http://media.wix.com/ugd/2bc3fc+c275051cd7b4a48759
fcc5c77e34f7fab.pdf. 
 52. Id. at 2. 
 53. NEV. INTERSCHOLASTIC ACTIVITIES ASS’N, NIAA GENDER IDENTITY 
PARTICIPATION POSITION STATEMENT 1 (2014) [hereinafter NEV. POSITION], 
http://static.psbin.com/e/f/6n109pv2gzrb5c/NIAA_Gender_Identity_Participation_P
osition_Statement_1-15-2014.pdf. 
 54. N.Y. STATE PUB. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, NYSPHSAA BYLAWS AND 
ELIGIBILITY STANDARDS 154–55 (2015) [hereinafter N.Y. POLICY], 
http://www.nysphsaa.org/Portals/0/PDF/Handbook/2015-
16%20School%20Year/December%202015/ByLaws%20and%20Eligibility%20Stand
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“guidelines” that permit transgender students’ gender-consonant 
participation.  However, the non-mandatory nature of these 
guidelines permits a school to impose limitations or restrictions on 
such participation without any penalty or effect on schools’ 
membership status within the association.55 
The limitation contained in Iowa’s athletic association policy 
is unique as well:  Only transgender boys—that is, individuals who 
identify as male who were designated “female” at birth—are 
eligible to participate in boys’ athletics, allowing them gender-
consonant participation.56  However, the policy is silent about 
transgender girls, and thus seems to deny them the same 
opportunities for gender-consonant participation.57 
4. Gender-Consonant Policies Without Exceptions or 
Limitations 
Twelve states have adopted the most inclusive policies for 
transgender students’ gender-consonant participation in school 
sports:  California,58 Connecticut,59 Massachusetts,60 Minnesota,61 
Nevada,62 New Hampshire,63 Rhode Island,64 Vermont,65 
Virginia,66 and Washington,67 
 
ards%20-%20Handbook%2012-21-15.pdf. 
 55. NEV. POSITION, supra note 53, at 1; N.Y. POLICY, supra note 54, at 154–55. 
 56. IOWA HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2015–2016 IHSAA HANDBOOK 14 (2015) , 
http://www.iahsaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2015_16_Handbook_Final.pdf. 
 57. See id. 
 58. CAL. INTERSCHOLASTIC FED’N, GUIDELINES FOR GENDER IDENTITY 
PARTICIPATION (2015), http://static.psbin.com/m/5/0ndq7wwfgh2em9/Guidelines_
for_Gender_Identity_Participation.pdf. 
 59. CONN. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, CIAC HANDBOOK 2015–16, at 56 
(2015) [hereinafter CONN. POLICY], http://www.casciac.org/pdfs/
ciachandbook_1516.pdf. 
 60. MASS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, GENDER IDENTITY POLICY 
CLARIFICATION (2014) [hereinafter MASS. POLICY], http://www.miaa.net/gen/
miaa_generated_bin/documents/basic_module/GenderIdentityIcon.pdf. 
 61. MINN. STATE HIGH SCH. LEAGUE, 2015–2016 MSHSL OFFICIAL HANDBOOK :  
300.0 ADMINISTRATION OF STUDENT ELIGIBILITY BYLAWS 53 (2015), 
http://www.mshsl.org/mshsl/Publications/code/handbook/300%20Bylaws.pdf. 
 62. NEV. POSITION, supra note 53. 
 63. N.H. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, NHIAA HANDBOOK: BY-LAW 
ARTICLE III, SPORTS MEDICINE 52–53 (2015), http://nhiaa.org/PDFs/5510
5ByLawArticleIIISportsMedicine.pdf. 
 64. R.I. INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE, RULES AND REGULATIONS: ARTICLE 1, 
ORGANIZATION 11–13 (2015), http://www.riil.org/files/8214/3861/6354/
ARTICLE_1_ORGANIZATION_2015.pdf. 
 65. VPA Activities/Athletics Policies, VT. PRINCIPALS’ ASS’N, 
http://www.vpaonline.org/Page/233 (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
 66. VA. HIGH SCH. LEAGUE, VIRGINIA HIGH SCHOOL LEAGUE, INC. HANDBOOK 
AND POLICY MANUAL 2015–16, at 108–10 (2015) [hereinafter VA. POLICY], 
http://www.vhsl.org/doc/upload/pub-handbook-2015-163.pdf. 
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The majority of these policies are modeled on the Washington 
Interscholastic Athletic Association’s (WIAA) policy, which was the 
first such policy adopted by an interscholastic athletic 
association.68  Under the WIAA’s policy, transgender students are 
eligible to participate in athletics according to their gender 
identities.69  The policy outlines a process for verifying the 
student’s gender identity in the event questions arise.70  The 
process requires an eligibility determination by a “gender identity 
eligibility committee” convened by the athletic association71 whose 
role it is to determine that the student’s gender-identity claim is 
bona fide.72  The policy requires the student to submit 
documentation of the student’s gender identity to the Committee, 
although it is permissive about the form that the documentation 
may take.73  Medical records are not necessary, as the policy 
permits the student to document his or her gender identity by 
submitting, for example, “affirmed written statements from [the] 
student and/or [the student’s] parent/guardian.”74  In the event 
that the committee denies the student’s request for gender-
consonant participation, the student may appeal that decision to 
the association’s executive director.75 
Some permissive participation policies in this category differ 
from the WIAA model by limiting the role of the state association 
in gender-eligibility determinations.  For example, the Connecticut 
Interscholastic Athletic Conference and the Massachusetts 
 
 67. WASH. INTERSCHOLASTIC ACTIVITIES ASS’N, 2015–2016 WIAA OFFICIAL 
HANDBOOK: ELIGIBILITY 31–32 (2015) [hereinafter WASH. POLICY], 
http://www.wiaa.com/ConDocs/Con1544/Eligibility.pdf. 
 68. See Erin E. Buzuvis, Transgender Student-Athletes and Sex-Segregated 
Sport: Developing Policies of Inclusion for Intercollegiate and Interscholastic 
Athletics, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 24–25 (2011). 
 69. WASH. POLICY, supra note 67, at 32. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Such a committee must be comprised of  
three of the following persons, one of whom must be from the physician o r 
mental health profession category:  
  A. Physician with experience in gender identity health care and the  
World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) 
Standards of Care. 
  B. Psychiatrist, psychologist or licensed mental health professional 
familiar with the World Professional Association for Transgender 
Health (WPATH) Standards of Care. 
   C. School administrator from a non-appealing school 
   D. WIAA staff member 
   E. Advocate familiar with Gender Identity and Expression issues[.] 
Id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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Interscholastic Athletic Association both require the student’s 
school to determine that “the expression of the student’s gender 
identity is bona fide and not for the purpose of gaining an unfair 
advantage in competitive athletics.”76  Once the school has 
included that student’s name on the roster of a gender-specific 
sports team, the association defers to the school district’s 
determination.77 
The Virginia High School League (VHSL) has a gender-
consonant participation policy which differs from the WIAA’s 
policy by imposing stricter documentation requirements on a 
transgender student seeking to exercise that right.78  In Virginia, a 
transgender student must submit: (1) a written statement 
affirming the student’s gender; (2) written statements from 
individuals such as parents, teachers, or friends affirming the 
student’s gender; (3) a list of treatment and medications related to 
the student’s gender identity; and (4) written verification of the 
student’s gender from a health care provider.79  This 
documentation is presented to a VHSL committee, called the 
“District Committee,” which makes the initial determination of 
whether the student’s asserted gender-identity is “not for the 
purpose of gaining an unfair advantage in competitive athletics.”80  
However, the District Committee’s determination does not take 
effect until the VHSL Executive Director concurs.81  If either the 
District Committee or the Executive Director disagrees with a 
determination of eligibility, the policy permits the student to 
appeal the decision to the VHSL Executive Committee.82 
B. Non-Scholastic Youth Sports 
Organizations other than schools also provide abundant 
opportunities for youth to participate in sports.  Many sport-
specific organizations are affiliated with a particular sport’s 
national governing body (“NGB”), and, thus, abide by the NGB’s 
rules for competition and its other policies.  Some NGBs have 
adopted policies regarding participation by transgender athletes. 
 
One such NGB is the United States Soccer Federation 
 
 76. CONN. POLICY, supra note 59, at 56; MASS. POLICY,  supra note 60. 
 77. CONN. POLICY, supra note 59, at 56; MASS. POLICY, supra note 60. 
 78. Compare VA. POLICY, supra note 66, at 108–10, with WASH. POLICY,  sup ra 
note 67, at 31–32. 
 79. VA. POLICY, supra note 66, at 109. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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(USSF), the national governing body for soccer.83  In 2013, the 
USSF adopted a policy requiring its member organizations—with 
the exception of professional and national teams—to permit 
transgender athletes to “register with the gender team with which 
the player identifies.”84  Organizations may only require 
documentation to confirm that the player’s stated gender “is 
sincerely held, and part of a person’s core identity,” which may 
include government-issued documentation or documentation 
prepared by a health-care provider, counselor, or other qualified 
professional.85  USSF’s largest affiliate is the United States Youth 
Soccer Association, which boasts over three million members.86 
Similarly, USA Swimming issued a set of “recommended 
practices” to its member clubs for governing transgender youth 
participation.87  These recommendations permit gender-identity 
based participation and have no restrictions or specific 
documentation requirements.88  In addition, the recommendations 
encourage member clubs to allow transgender athletes to use 
locker rooms and restrooms according to their identities and to 
wear “whatever swimsuit is most comfortable for them.”89 
In contrast, other national governing bodies have adopted 
more restrictive policies that apply even to youth programs.  USA 
Track and Field, which oversees over 2,000 youth clubs, requires 
transgender athletes to comply with requirements copied from the 
International Olympic Committee’s policies in order to compete 
according to their gender identities.90  To compete according to 
their gender identities, athletes must undergo genital 
reconstructive surgery and hormone treatment, change their sex 
 
 83. U.S. Soccer Reaching New Heights, U.S. SOCCER, http://www.ussoccer.com/
about/about-us-soccer (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
 84. U.S. SOCCER FED’N, USSF POLICY AMENDMENTS AFFIRMED AT JUNE  2013  
ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING 2 (2013), http://media.wix.com/ugd/2bc3fc_d4601f281
da449648ca4c60d0d81a526.pdf. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Key Statistics, US YOUTH SOCCER, http://www.usyouthsoccer.org/media_kit/
keystatistics/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2016). 
 87. USA SWIMMING, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR THE INCLUSION OF MI NOR 
TRANSGENDER ATHLETES 1–2 (2015), http://media.wix.com/ugd/2bc3fc_2dd9480f771
b45a48537f742e35a965c.pdf. 
 88. Id. at 1. 
 89. Id. at 1–2. 
 90. See USATF Statement Regarding Transgender/Transsexual Policy , USA 
TRACK & FIELD, http://www.usatf.org/About/Privacy---Other-Policies/Transgender-
Transsexual.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2016) [hereinafter TRACK & FIELD POLICY] 
(citing INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., STATEMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONSENSUS ON SE X 
REASSIGNMENT IN SPORTS (2003), http://www.olympic.com/Documents/Reports/
EN/en_report_905.pdf). 
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on legal documents, and adhere to a two-year waiting period.91  
USA Boxing92 and USA Gymnastics93 have identical policies, 
although USA Gymnastics makes an exception for transgender 
athletes who have not yet reached the age of puberty.94 
II. Critique of Birth Certificate Policies 
As discussed above, birth certificate policies effectively ban 
young transgender athletes from gender-consonant participation 
because those athletes typically cannot fulfill the requirements—
which often include permanent and invasive genital reconstructive 
surgery—for changing their birth certificates.95  This Part will 
argue that sport organizations should reject these policies because 
they are out of sync with the medical, ethical, and legal 
consensuses about the significance of gender identity and the 
harm individuals experience when sports’ governing bodies 
disregard or suppress individuals’ gender identities. 
A. Birth Certificate Policies Conflict with Medical 
Consensus About Gender Identity and Cause 
Psychological Harm 
Gender identity, a person’s basic sense of being male or 
female, is something far from trivial, but is rather a deeply felt, 
core component of a person’s identity.96  Medical experts assert 
that gender identity is a “fundamental part of being human”97 and 
“the most important determinant of a person’s sex”—even more 
important than other sex-determinant factors such as 
chromosomes, hormones, genitalia, and secondary sex 
characteristics.98  Gender identity is “innate”99 and, it is believed, 
 
 91. Id. (citing INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., STATEMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM 
CONSENSUS ON SEX REASSIGNMENT IN SPORTS (2003), 
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en_report_905.pdf). 
 92. USA BOXING, MEDICAL HANDBOOK AND MEDICAL RULES OF AIBA OPEN 
BOXING 4 (2013) [hereinafter BOXING POLICY], http://media.wix.com/ugd/
2bc3fc_097c27dfc6784e9eb89d7c5ab44dd399.pdf. 
 93. USA GYMNASTICS, USA GYMNASTICS POLICY FOR TRANSGENDER INCLUSI ON 
3 (2015) [hereinafter GYMNASTICS POLICY], http://media.wix.com/ugd/
2bc3fc_2a79ff51fb2f40a6ac0c1ad4a2493543.pdf. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 96. BRILL & PEPPER, supra note 21, at 14. 
 97. Brief of World Professional Association for Transgender Health, Pediatric 
Endocrine Society, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, G.G. v. Gloucester 
Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 15-2056 (4th Cir. 2015), 2015 WL 6724594, at *12 [hereinafter 
Gloucester Brief]. 
 98. Brief for Maine Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics, et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Doe v. Clenchy, 86 A.3d 600 (Me. 2013) , 2013 
WL 8349676, at *8 [hereinafter Clenchy Brief]; see also Norman P. Spack, An 
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reflects “a strong biological and genetic component.”100  In all, the 
primacy and essential nature of gender identity means that a 
transgender girl is a girl, and a transgender boy is a boy. 
Though people typically recognizes their gender identities at 
a young age, gender identity cannot be determined at birth.  As 
such, a doctor does not consider gender identity when identifying 
an individual as “male” or “female” on a person’s birth certificate.  
When institutions assign people to sex-specific facilities or 
activities based on birth certificates, they do not limit 
opportunities for those whose gender identities and birth-assigned 
sexes align.  But such classifications can and do cause 
“tremendous pain and harm” to transgender individuals.101  Birth-
certificate based classifications often force transgender individuals 
to suppress or deny their gender identities and to experience the 
indignity of having their true selves disregarded.102  This can 
cause emotional distress,103 which, for some, rises to the level of 
clinical significance in the form of a diagnosis called gender 
dysphoria.104 
In contrast, policies that permit gender-consonant 
participation are “critically important”105 to transgender 
individuals for a host of reasons, including promoting emotional, 
psychological, physical, and academic benefits.106  By supporting 
healthy identity-formation and fostering relationships among 
same-gender peers, institutional recognition of the centrality of an 
individual’s gender identity helps alleviate the distress that a 
transgender adolescent may experience.107  Such actions are 
especially important in the scholastic context, as schools are “the 
primary social setting in which friends are made, social skills are 
 
Endocrine Perspective on the Care of Transgender Adolescents, 13 J. GAY & LESBIAN 
MENTAL HEALTH 309, 312–13 (2009) (discussing the medical and mental health 
approaches to caring for transgender youths’ physical and emotional health). 
 99. Gloucester Brief, supra note 97, at *14. 
 100. Clenchy Brief, supra note 98, at *6. 
 101. Gloucester Brief, supra note 97, at *15. 
 102. Harper Jean Tobin & Jennifer Levi, Securing Equal Access to Sex-
Segregated Facilities for Transgender Students, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 301, 
302 (2013). 
 103. Id. at 302, 306. 
 104. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, GENDER DYSPHORIA 1 (2013), 
http://www.dsm5.org/documents/gender%20dysphoria%20fact%20sheet.pdf. 
 105. Scott Skinner-Thompson & Ilona M. Turner, Title IX’s Protections for 
Transgender Student Athletes, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 271, 296 (2013). 
 106. Id. at 298. 
 107. Id. at 299; see also Gloucester Brief, supra note 97, at *16–17 (no ting that 
the “distress that transgender individuals may experience can be eased” through 
support and affirmation of the individual’s gender).  
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learned, and self-efficacy is developed.”108  In the athletic context, 
gender-consonant policies promote participation by transgender 
students who would otherwise be deterred by rules that classify 
them in a manner at odds with their core identities.  Athletic 
participation provides many positive benefits to youth in general, 
including psychological resiliency, feelings of connectedness, and 
positive self-image.109  These benefits may be particularly valuable 
and relevant to transgender youth, who face an elevated risk of 
isolation, truancy, harassment, and suicide.110 
In summary, birth-certificate based policies are painfully 
exclusionary for transgender youth.  In contrast, policies that 
permit gender-consonant participation promote healthy identity 
formation and provide protection against the risks associated with 
distress.  Schools and other organizations provide athletic 
opportunities to youth with the belief that sports are good for 
young persons’ physical, social, and emotional wellness.  Birth 
certificate-based policies are antithetical to these goals. 
B. Birth Certificate Policies Conflict with Title IX and 
Anti-Discrimination Laws in Many States 
The only judicial decision to have considered the validity of a 
policy excluding transgender athletes from gender-consonant 
participation in athletics is Richards v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n.111  The 
Richards court ruled that the U.S. Tennis Association (USTA) 
engaged in unlawful sex discrimination when it excluded a 
transgender woman, Renee Richards, from competing as a woman 
in the 1976 U.S. Open.112  The court faulted the USTA for using 
Richards’s chromosomes as the basis for classifying her as “male,” 
disregarding the fact that she was “psychologically a woman.”113  
While contemporary athletics programs no longer use chromosome 
tests to exclude transgender athletes, the application of birth-
certificate policies to youth and scholastic sports are a similar 
means of exclusion, since transgender youth are as incapable of 
 
 108. Gloucester Brief, supra note 97, at *12 (“Simply put, schools are ‘a central 
component in virtually every adolescent’s life.’” (quoting Deana F. Morrow,  Social  
Work Practice with Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Adolescents, 85 FAMS.  
SOC’Y 91, 93 (2004))). 
 109. See Buzuvis, supra note 68, at 46–47. 
 110. See Sari L. Reisner et al., Mental Health of Transgender Youth in Care at 
an Adolescent Urban Community Health Center: A Matched Retrospective Cohort 
Study, 56 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 274 (2015) (finding that transgender youth are  
at greater risk for negative mental health outcomes than cisgender youth). 
 111. Richards v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1977). 
 112. Id. at 272. 
 113. Id. 
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changing their birth certificates114 as Richards was of changing 
her chromosomes.  As such, the Richards court’s admonishment of 
USTA’s policy should resonate with any court considering the 
legality of birth certificate policies under relevant sources of law—
including Title IX and state antidiscrimination laws.  Courts and 
regulators have interpreted Title IX as holding that birth 
certificate policies are prohibited sex discrimination.  And, what is 
more, birth certificate policies that apply in interscholastic and 
youth sports conflict with the laws of several states that prohibit 
gender-identity discrimination in education and public 
accommodations. 
1. Birth Certificate Policies Inflict Sex 
Discrimination Prohibited by Constitutional and 
Federal Civil Rights Law 
With increasing frequency, courts and regulators understand 
that discrimination against transgender individuals is a form of 
sex discrimination that violates constitutional and statutory 
mandates for equal protection and equal access to educational 
opportunities based on sex.  This Subpart will explain the basis for 
imposing these civil rights protections on athletic associations, 
their member institutions, and other non-scholastic youth sports 
programs.  It will then present the arguments that are emerging 
about why the sources of legal protection against sex 
discrimination prohibit these bodies from restricting gender-
consonant participation. 
i. Scope of Equal Protection and Title IX 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits government entities and other state actors from 
discriminating against citizens on the basis of sex, unless the 
state’s conduct serves “important governmental objectives 
and . . . the discriminatory means employed are substantially 
related to the achievement of those objectives.”115  School districts 
are government entities bound by the Equal Protection Clause, 
and the “pervasive entwinement” between state athletic 
associations and their public school members, as well as state-level 
education officials, means that school districts are also state actors 
subject to the Constitution’s requirements.116  Outside the 
 
 114. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 115. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. fo r 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).  
 116. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 303 
(2001). 
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educational context, courts have found that youth sports programs 
are state actors because of their close relationships with municipal 
governments and because they use public facilities.  Thus, the 
Constitution’s prohibition on sex discrimination arguably applies 
to many youth sports programs as well.117 
In addition to the U.S. Constitution, several federal civil 
rights laws protect citizens against discrimination based on sex.  
One such law, Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 
prohibits sex discrimination by educational institutions—both 
public and private—that receive federal funds.118  In some 
circumstances, courts have found that Title IX covers 
interscholastic athletic associations themselves.119 
 
 117. See, e.g., Fortin v. Darlington Little League, 514 F.2d 344, 351 (1st Cir. 
1975) (holding that a little league baseball chapter, as a state actor, could not 
categorically exclude girls); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 169–70 (D. 
Colo. 1977) (holding that a high school could not constitutionally exclude a girl from 
the boys’ soccer team on the sole basis of gender); Clinton v. Nagy, 411 F. Supp. 
1396, 1400 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause requires a 
municipal football league to let a qualified girl play). 
 118. See, e.g., Valesky v. Aquinas Acad., Civ. No. 09-800, 2011 WL 4102584 
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2011) (holding that Title IX applies to Catholic schools that 
participate in the national school lunch and e-rate technology subsidy programs, as 
well as to a non-participating school operated by the same diocese); Russo v. 
Diocese of Greensburg, Civ. No. 09-1169, 2010 WL 3656579 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 
2010) (finding that, by accepting any federal funds, Title IX applies to the entire ty 
of a school’s operations). 
 119. An athletic association that is an agent of the state education agency and 
which receives federal funds is subject to Title IX.  Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic 
Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265, 271–72 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that dues payments to the 
association by federally funded member schools supports the application of Title 
IX); see also PA. POLICY, supra note 46, at 1 (“The resolution must state that, in  all 
matters pertaining to interscholastic athletic activities, the school shall be 
governed by the Constitution and By-Laws of the PIAA.”).  Additionally, an athletic 
association whose members receive federal funding may be subject to  Title  IX on 
the basis of the association’s “controlling authority” over its members.  See Cmtys. 
for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 852 (W.D. Mich. 
2001); cf. Kemether v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 740, 
767 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that an association was subject to Title IX because  o f  
the association’s requirement that federally funded member schools submit to  the  
association’s authority and pay dues).  However, in the absence of the Supreme 
Court’s endorsement, see Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 
469–70 (1999) (refusing to consider “controlling authority” arguments raised by the  
plaintiffs), the test is not universally applied.  See Parker v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic 
Ass’n, No. 1:09-cv-885-WTL-JMS, 2009 WL 4806943 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 02, 2009) 
(rejecting the argument that an athletic association is subject to Title IX without 
considering the “controlling authority” test); Johnny’s Icehouse, Inc. v. Amateur 
Hockey Ass’n of Ill., 134 F. Supp. 2d 965, 970 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (same). 
Yet even where an association is not directly subject to Title IX, a student-
plaintiff may indirectly challenge an association’s discriminatory policy by suing 
the student’s own school, which is subject to Title IX, and naming competitor 
schools that are also subject to Title IX as co-defendants.  Parker v. Franklin Cty. 
Cmty. Sch. Corp., 667 F.3d 910, 924 (7th Cir. 2012).  While the competitor schoo ls 
would not be liable to the plaintiff for monetary damages, they would be bou nd by 
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ii.Transgender Discrimination Is Sex 
Discrimination 
Courts and regulators are increasingly recognizing that 
discrimination against transgender individuals is a form of sex 
discrimination under both the Constitution and Title IX.  Courts 
commonly reach this conclusion by applying the principle that sex 
discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of gender 
stereotypes.  The origin of this interpretation is the 1989 Supreme 
Court decision, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.120  In Price 
Waterhouse, the Court endorsed the idea that, under Title VII, the 
federal employment discrimination statute, discrimination based 
on an individual’s failure to conform with gender stereotypes is a 
form of sex discrimination.121  Though Price Waterhouse did not 
involve a transgender plaintiff, lower courts have applied its 
rationale to protect transgender plaintiffs who are fired, harassed, 
or otherwise discriminated against for defying societal 
expectations that a person’s sex must always align with that 
person’s gender identity and expression.122  Moreover, they have 
recognized this protection not only as a matter of statutory law, 
but constitutional law as well.123 
Contemporary courts and regulators have expanded this 
gender-stereotype rationale to provide additional support for the 
conclusion that sex discrimination statutes protect transgender 
individuals.  According to one district court, discrimination against 
a transgender employee amounts to sex discrimination when it 
targets the employee because of the employee’s gender 
transition.124  In that case, the court compared the employer, 
which had revoked the plaintiff’s job offer after finding out she 
planned to transition to a female appearance, to an employer who 
discriminates against someone because they converted to a 
 
any injunctive relief awarded to the plaintiff, who would otherwise be “left without 
an effective remedy.”  Id. 
 120. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 121. Id. at 250–51 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17).  Courts regularly apply 
Title VII decisions that interpret sex discrimination to cases applying Title IX.  See 
Johnson v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 122. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(drawing a parallel between an employer “who discriminates against women 
because, for instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup” and employers “who 
discriminate against men because they do wear dresses or makeup, o r o therwise  
act femininely”). 
 123. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that discrimination against a transgender plaintiff is sex discrimination for 
purposes of applying heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, and 
noting that “[a] person is defined as transgender precisely because of the perception 
that his or her behavior transgresses gender stereotypes”). 
 124. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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different religion.125  Just as the latter would clearly constitute 
religious discrimination because the employer is considering 
religion when singling out the plaintiff, so too is the former sex 
discrimination.126 
Recently, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), the agency responsible for enforcing Title VII, has applied 
a definition of sex discrimination that categorically includes 
discrimination against transgender employees.127  This 
interpretation is even broader than existing judicial 
interpretations because it covers discrimination based directly on 
a plaintiff’s transgender status, rather than limiting that 
protection to cases where the plaintiff can prove that 
discrimination was specifically motivated by nonconformity with 
stereotypes or by the fact of their transition.128  The foundation for 
this interpretation is particular language in Price Waterhouse 
which rejects a narrow reading of sex discrimination as confined to 
one’s “biological” or birth-assigned sex.129  The Price Waterhouse 
Court read “sex” to include “gender,” and prohibited employers 
from “tak[ing] gender into account in making an employment 
decision.”130  By definition, transgender individuals are people 
whose internal understandings of their own genders do not 
correspond to their birth-assigned sexes.131  Thus, to single out a 
transgender person for not comporting with gender stereotypes is 
necessarily to target that person because that person’s gender and 
sex are not aligned; in other words, it “take[s] gender into  
 
 
 
account.”132  As such, discrimination against someone because that 
person is transgender is, necessarily, sex discrimination.133 
 
 125. Id. at 306–07. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (Apr. 20, 2012), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120120821%20Macy%20v%20DOJ%20ATF.txt. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989)). 
 130. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989). 
 131. Understanding Gender, supra note 17. 
 132. Macy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 
at 242). 
 133. Id.  The Commission stated: 
When an employer discriminates against someone because the  person is 
transgender, the employer has engaged in disparate treatment “related to  
the sex of the victim.”  This is true regardless of whether an employer 
discriminates against an employee because the individual has expressed 
his or her gender in a non-stereotypical fashion, because the  employer is 
uncomfortable with the fact that the person has transitioned or is in the 
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iii.  Application to Athletics Policies 
To date, no judicial cases or administrative decisions have 
considered whether a policy that excludes transgender athletes 
from gender-consonant participation, such as a birth certificate 
policy, constitutes sex discrimination under any of the theories 
described above.  However, the above interpretations are readily 
available for courts and regulators to use to support the conclusion 
that such policies violate Title IX and/or the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
Birth certificate policies clearly constitute sex 
discrimination—which, by definition, includes discrimination on 
the basis of transgender status per se—because they exclude 
transgender girls from girls’ sports and transgender boys from 
boys’ sports because of their transgender status.  In 2015, the 
EEOC reached a similar conclusion in a case about a transgender 
employee’s gender-consonant access to sex-specific restrooms.134  
In that case, the EEOC specifically rejected the employer’s 
arguments that the employee could be excluded because she had 
not yet undergone a surgical transition.135 
The Department of Education (DOE) similarly believes that 
sex discrimination statutes like Title IX prohibit the exclusion of 
transgender students from sex-specific facilities consonant with 
their gender identities.136  In November 2015, the agency found 
that a school district had violated Title IX by excluding a 
transgender girl from the girls’ locker room.137  The DOE’s 
 
process of transitioning from one gender to another , or because the 
employer simply does not like that the person is identifying as a 
transgender person.  In each of these circumstances, the employer is 
making a gender-based evaluation, thus violating the Supreme Court’s 
admonition [from Price Waterhouse] that “an employer may not take 
gender into account in making an employment decision.” 
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir . 
2000); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244); see also Rumble v. Fairview Heath 
Servs., No. 14-CV-2037, 2015 WL 1197415, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015) 
(“Because the term ‘transgender’ describes people whose gender expression dif fe rs 
from their assigned sex at birth, discrimination based on an individual’s 
transgender status constitutes discrimination based on gender stereotyping.”). 
 134. Lusardi v. McHugh, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133395 (Apr. 1, 2015), 
www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120133395.txt. 
 135. Id.  The Commission also rejected the employer’s arguments that the 
complainant had at one point agreed not to use the women’s restroom and that 
supervisors and co-workers would be uncomfortable with her presence in the 
women’s restroom.  Id. 
 136. Letter from Adele Rapport, Reg’l Dir., Dep’t of Ed. Office for Civil Rights, to  
Daniel Cates, OCR Case No. 05-14-1055 (Nov. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Letter from 
Adele Rapport], http://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/township-high-211-
letter.pdf. 
 137. Id. 
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settlement agreements with other school districts further reflect 
its position on gender-consonant access to facilities.138 
As these administrative examples demonstrate, sex 
discrimination occurs when a decision-maker fails to treat a 
transgender person according to that person’s affirmed gender in 
the particular context of sex-segregated facilities.  What is more, 
these conclusions foreshadow the invalidity of birth certificate 
policies.  Since birth certificate policies affect a similar exclusion of 
transgender youth and adolescents from gender-consonant 
participation in sex-segregated athletics, courts and 
administrative agencies could use similar lines of reasoning to 
invalidate them. 
The gender-stereotyping interpretation of sex discrimination 
also suggests that birth certificate policies are invalid in 
interscholastic and youth sports.  To date, courts applying the 
gender-stereotyping theory have mostly addressed stereotypes 
relating to appearance and mannerisms.139  For example, the Sixth 
Circuit found that Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination applied to 
discrimination against a transgender woman whose physical 
appearance and outward behavior were inconsistent with 
stereotypes associated with the male sex she was assigned at 
birth.140  Admittedly, this particular stereotype theory would not 
assist a transgender girl challenging a birth certificate policy—she 
would not be excluded from girls’ sports for failing to conform to 
male stereotypes.  However,  a gender stereotype does arguably 
motivate the exclusion of transgender individuals from gender-
consonant participation:  the stereotype that all people who 
identify as girls were assigned a female sex at birth—in other 
words, that “girls” does not include transgender girls.  While this 
particular stereotype has not yet been expressly recognized by 
 
 138. Resolution Agreement, Downey Unified Sch. Dist., OCR Case No. 09-12-
1095 (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/downey-schoo l-
district-agreement.pdf; Resolution Agreement Between the Arcadia Unif ied Sch. 
Dist., the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, and the U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 
Civil Rights Div., OCR Case No. 09-12-1020, at 2 (July 24, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/07/26/arcadiaagree.pdf. 
 139. See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(finding compelling evidence that an employer’s hiring decision was “infected by sex 
stereotypes” because the decision-maker admitted that when she “viewed the 
photographs of [plaintiff] in traditionally feminine attire, with a feminine hairstyle  
and makeup, she saw a man in woman’s clothing”); Smith v. City o f Salem, 378 
F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded claims 
of sex stereotyping and gender discrimination by alleging “that [plaintiff’s]  failure  
to conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a man should look and beha ve  was 
the driving force behind [the employer’s] actions”). 
 140. Smith, 378 F.3d at 574. 
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courts,141 there is no reason why a court could not consider the 
stereotype of birth sex/gender-identity consistency to be prohibited 
grounds for excluding a transgender athlete from gender-
consonant participation.  Therefore, under both statutory and 
constitutional protections against discrimination on the basis of 
sex, courts and regulators could readily conclude that birth 
certificate policies are invalid. 
 
2. Birth Certificate Policies Conflict with State 
Laws That Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis 
of Gender Identity 
Thirteen states and the District of Columbia have laws that 
prohibit public primary and secondary educational institutions 
from discriminating against students on the basis of gender 
identity.142  These statutes provide even clearer sources of 
 
 141. In Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College District, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held, based on a reading of Title IX that incorporated Price 
Waterhouse, that a transgender female instructor who had sued for the right to use  
the women’s restroom during her transition had established a prima facie of sex 
discrimination.  Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. App’x 492, 493 (9th 
Cir. 2009).  The court appeared intuitively to accept Kastl as a gender 
nonconforming woman, in the sense that her anatomy, chromosomes, and birth-sex 
assignment defy stereotypes about the anatomy, chromosomes, and birth-sex 
assignment women typically have.  Unfortunately, the court also mistakenly 
applied the McDonnell-Douglas framework, see id. at 493–94 (citing McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)), which is only applicable in cases 
involving circumstantial evidence of sex discrimination.  See Vasquez v. Cnty. of 
Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2004).  This mistake invited unnecessary 
consideration of the college’s purported nondiscriminatory rationale and caused the 
court to affirm the lower court’s dismissal of the instructor’s case.  Id. at 494.   Still, 
the court notably applied Price Waterhouse to conclude that sex discrimination 
under Title IX includes treating a transgender woman differently from other 
women because of the male sex she was assigned at birth.  Id.; see also Etsitty v. 
Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007) (sidestepping the 
question of whether Price Waterhouse supports a finding of a prima facie case of sex 
discrimination in a transgender woman’s suit against her employer for excluding 
her from the women’s bathroom).  But see Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh o f  the  
Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 681 (W.D. Pa. 2015) 
(rejecting a transgender male plaintiff’s attempt to use Price Waterhouse to support 
his right to use male restrooms and locker rooms on campus); G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. 
Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., Civ. No. 4:15-cv-54, 2015 WL 5560190, at *8 (E.D. Va. 
Sept. 17, 2015) (same). 
 142. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 220 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-32-
109(1)(ll)(I) (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-15c (West 2011); D.C. CODE  
§ 2-1402.41 (2001); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102, 5/1-103 (West 2015); IOWA CODE  
ANN. § 216.9 (West 2008); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4591 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 76, § 5 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363A.03, 363A.13 (West 2015); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 233.010 (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 
2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030 
(West 2009); OR. ADMIN. R. 581-021-0045 (2008).  Nevada’s law does not cover 
educational institutions directly, but the state agency that enforces the statute has 
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protection for transgender students than constitutional and 
statutory protections because they eliminate the need for courts 
and regulators to make the inferential leap from sex 
discrimination to transgender discrimination.  Not surprisingly, 
therefore, courts have interpreted gender-identity statutes to 
prohibit schools from excluding transgender students from gender-
consonant facilities such as restrooms,143 and regulators have 
interpreted them to permit gender-consonant athletic participation 
as a matter of public law.144  To be sure, none of the states with 
gender identity enumerated in their education nondiscrimination 
statutes are the states whose athletic associations restrict 
transgender students’ participation to the sex designated on their 
birth certificates.145  However, if a birth certificate policy ever did 
take hold in one of these states through an amendment to state 
law or a revision of an athletic association’s policy, the policy 
would likely not withstand challenge under anti-discrimination 
laws. 
Non-scholastic youth sports programs are not governed by 
Title IX or any of the other education-specific state laws discussed 
so far in this Article.  However, seventeen states and the District 
of Columbia have laws that prohibit places of public 
accommodation from discriminating against members of the public 
on the basis of gender identity,146 and public accommodations laws 
 
suggested that educational institutions are included as places of public 
accommodations, which are covered under the law.  See Public Accommodations ,  
NEV. EQUAL RIGHTS COMM’N, http://detr.state.nv.us/Nerc_pages/public_
accomodation_discrimination.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2016).  Though not a 
statute or legislative rule, the Rhode Island Department of Education has a non-
legislative policy that prohibits excluding students from educational and 
extracurricular activities on the basis of gender identity.  R.I. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
BOARD OF REGENTS POLICY STATEMENT ON DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY/EXPRESSION (2010). 
 143. Doe v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d 600, 603 (Me. 2014). 
 144. CONN. SAFE SCH. COAL., GUIDELINES FOR CONNECTICUT SCHOOLS TO 
COMPLY WITH GENDER IDENTITY AND EXPRESSION NON-DISCIRMINATION LAWS: 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 3–4 (2012), http://www.ct.gov/chro/lib/chro/
Guidelines_for_Schools_on_Gender_Identity_and_Expression_final_4 -24-12.pdf ; 
MASS. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., GUIDANCE FOR MASSACHUSETTS 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, CREATING A SAFE AND SUPPORTIVE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT: 
NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY 2–3 (2016), 
http://www.doe.mass.edu/ssce/GenderIdentity.pdf. 
 145. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 146. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-301, 24-34-601 
(2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-64, 81d (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4504 
(2013); D.C. CODE § 2-1401.02 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-3 (2008); 775 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/1-102, 103 (2011); IOWA CODE § 216.2 (2009); ME. STAT. tit. 5, § 4553 
(2013); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-301 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. § 363A.03 
(2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.050 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (1992); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659A.400, 174.100 (2013) ; R.I.  
GEN. LAWS § 11-24-3 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4501 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE  
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cover youth sports programs in many cases.147  While no NGBs 
have expressly adopted a birth certificate policy for  youth sports, 
only a few, such as USA Soccer, have expressly prohibited local 
organizations from limiting transgender athletes’ opportunities 
according to their birth certificates.148  In the absence of an NGB 
policy requiring local youth sport programs to permit gender-
consonant participation, these programs risk violating state 
antidiscrimination laws by limiting transgender athletes’ 
participation to the sex on their birth certificates.  
C. Conclusion 
Birth certificate policies are endorsed by scholastic athletic 
associations in several states and may permissibly operate by 
default in youth sports programs whose NGBs have failed to adopt 
policies to the contrary.  Such policies effect an absolute exclusion 
on transgender athletes’ gender-consonant participation, 
undermining their ability to live “as who they really are” and 
contributing to their psychological distress.  Moreover, while no 
existing case law evaluates birth certificate policies under Title IX 
and state antidiscrimination laws, sex-discrimination laws are 
increasingly protective of transgender individuals in other 
contexts, including those that, like athletics, are segregated by 
sex.149  Therefore, not only are birth certificate policies out of step 
with prevailing medical and ethical standards, but they likely 
violate the law as well. 
 
§ 49.60.040 (2008). 
 147. E.g., Nathanson v. Spring Lake Park Panther Youth Football Ass’n, No. 
CIV. 151-510 ADM/BRT, 2015 WL 5286770, at *5 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 2015) 
(holding that a youth football association is a place of public accommodation under 
Minnesota’s public accommodations law); Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athle tic 
All., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1158 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (holding that a gay softball 
tournament was a place of public accommodation under Washington’s public 
accommodations law); see also Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1223 
(E.D. Wash. 2001) (finding that the NCAA is a public accommodation for purposes 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)); Shultz v. Hemet Youth Pony 
League, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1222, 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that a youth 
baseball league is a place of public accommodation under the ADA); United States 
v. Slidell Youth Football Ass’n, 387 F. Supp. 474, 483 (E.D. La. 1974) (holding that 
a youth football league was a place of public accommodation under a federal civil 
rights law). 
 148. U.S. SOCCER FED’N, supra note 84, at 2. 
 149. See, e.g., Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) (correctional 
facilities); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (public 
employment). 
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III. Critique of Hormone Policies and Other Gender-
Consonant Policies That Contain Limitations and 
Restrictions 
As explained above, gender identity is the central 
determining factor of one’s gender classification; a transgender girl 
is a girl irrespective of her physical characteristics.  For this 
reason, athletic organizations—particularly those serving children 
and adolescents—should validate the gender identities of all 
transgender participants, not just those who are able and ready to 
undergo drastic medical interventions, such as genital 
reconstructive surgery150 or treatment with cross-sex hormones.151  
After providing some background on the various medical 
interventions that such policies may require, this Subpart will 
explain how hormone policies have the potential to harm 
transgender athletes.  It will also negate arguments that such 
policies are necessary to provide safe and fair athletic 
opportunities for non-transgender girls.  Finally, it will argue that 
hormone policies, as well as other policies that permit exclusions 
based on physical characteristics, are inconsistent with Title IX 
and many states’ antidiscrimination laws. 
 
A. Understanding Transition Options Available to 
Transgender Adolescents 
Children and adolescents who express gender dysphoria are 
increasingly receiving support from parents and other caregivers 
to undergo a transition process.152  Yet, the aspects of a person’s 
transition, including the timeline, are diverse and highly 
individualized.  Depending on the individual’s age, needs, 
resources, and environment, such a transition may be purely 
social, or it may include medical interventions in the form of 
hormone treatment.153  Surgical interventions, which transgender 
adults commonly undertake, are generally not available to 
transgender children and adolescents.154 
A “social transition” is the process of coming out as 
 
 150. For examples of such policies, see TRACK & FIELD POLICY, supra note 90; 
BOXING POLICY, supra note 92; GYMNASTICS POLICY, supra note 93. 
 151. IDAHO POLICY, supra note 37, at 87; MO. POLICY, supra note 38, at 136; 
OKLA. POLICY, supra note 39, at 82–83; OR. POLICY, supra note 40, at 98; WIS. 
POLICY, supra note 41, at 2. 
 152. See, e.g., Kelly Wallace, When Your Young Daughter Says ‘I’m a Boy , ’ CNN 
(June 2, 2015, 11:10 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/18/living/feat-transgender-
child-raising-ryland/ (discussing one family’s support of their transgender son). 
 153. See WPATH, supra note 32, at 2. 
 154. See id. at 16. 
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transgender to one’s family, friends, and community.155  
Transgender people may request to be referred to by gender-
affirming names and pronouns and to be allowed to express their 
gender identities through their clothing, hair, and other aspects of 
their outward appearance.156  For transgender children who have 
not yet undergone puberty, a social transition is often sufficient to 
alleviate gender dysphoria.157  Moreover, while a child’s gender 
dysphoria may persist into adulthood, such an outcome is not 
inevitable, and some studies have found that most gender-variant 
children do not grow into transgender adults.158  For this reason, 
prevailing standards delay medical interventions that are 
irreversible or that could cause difficulty for an individual whose 
gender dysphoria desists after childhood.159 
 
 
Puberty causes an adolescent’s body to develop secondary sex 
characteristics like breasts, menarche, voice change, or facial 
hair.160  For a transgender adolescent, it may be distressing to 
undergo such physical changes that are at odds with that 
individual’s gender identity and gender expression.  For this 
reason, many transgender adolescents, with the support of their 
parents and medical caregivers, opt to use hormones to delay the 
onset of puberty.161  Such a delay provides the advantage of 
avoiding distressful puberty while allowing the child to reach 
adolescence before making decisions about undergoing treatment 
with cross-sex hormones, which would feminize or masculinize 
their bodies consistent with their gender identity.162  This time is 
valuable because unlike gender dysphoria in children, gender 
dysphoria that manifests in adolescents rarely desists.163 
There is little consensus about the appropriate age to 
 
 155. See id. at 17. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. at 10. 
 158. Id. at 11 (citing “follow-up studies of prepubertal children (mainly boys) 
who were referred to clinics for assessment of gender dysphoria” that found “the  
dysphoria persisted into adulthood for only 6–23% of children”); see also Jack 
Drescher & Jack Pula, Ethical Issues Raised by the Treatment of Gender -Variant 
Prepubescent Children, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S17, S17 (2014) (“[G]ender 
dysphoria in childhood does not inevitably continue into adulthood, and only 6 to 23 
percent of boys and 12 to 27 percent of girls treated in gender clinics showed 
persistence of their gender dysphoria into adulthood.”). 
 159. WPATH, supra note 32, at 17. 
 160. See id. at 18–20. 
 161. See id. at 18–19. 
 162. Id. at 18. 
 163. Id. at 11. 
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prescribe cross-sex hormones for transgender adolescents.  While 
the Endocrine Society instructs providers to wait until their 
patients reach age sixteen, it is becoming increasingly common for 
providers to prescribe cross-sex hormones to their patients as 
young as age thirteen or fourteen.164  The decision if and when to 
start cross-sex hormones is personal and individualized, taking 
into account the individual’s emotional readiness, family support, 
access to health care, and financial resources.165 
If a transgender adolescent chooses to receive treatment with 
cross-sex hormones, that person’s body will undergo changes 
similar to puberty for the individual’s affirmed gender.166  For 
transgender individuals who identify as male, exogenous 
testosterone allows the body to develop masculine characteristics, 
such as a deepening voice and the development of body and facial 
hair.167  Testosterone also increases musculature and decreases fat 
content.168  For transgender individuals who identify as female, 
feminizing treatments typically combine anti-androgen agents, 
which suppress the body’s production or ability to use testosterone, 
with estrogen, which aids in fat redistribution, breast 
development, and softening of the skin.169 
Risks and sacrifices also accompany cross-sex hormones.  
Cross-sex hormone treatments produce an increased risk of 
hypertriglyceridemia in transgender women, while transgender 
men and women alike face at least the possibility of an increased 
risk of cardiovascular disease, hypertension, and diabetes, among 
 
 164. Priyanka Boghani, When Transgender Kids Transition, Medical Risks Are 
Both Known and Unknown, FRONTLINE (June 30, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/frontline/article/when-transgender-kids-transition-medical-risks-are-both-
known-and-unknown/; Angus Chen, Health Effects of Transitioning in Teen Years 
Remain Unknown, NPR: SHOTS (July 22, 2015, 11:18 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/07/22/424996915/health-e ffects-of -
transitioning-in-teen-years-remain-unknown. 
 165. See WPATH, supra note 32, at 20. 
 166. See id. at 18. 
 167. WPATH, supra note 32, at 37 tbl.1A; Hormone Administration, CTR. 
EXCELLENCE FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, U.C.S.F., http://transhealth.ucsf.edu/
trans?page=protocol-hormones (last visited Jan. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Hormone 
Administration]. 
 168. Michaela C. Devries, Do Transitioned Athletes Compete at an Advantage o r 
Disadvantage as Compared with Physically Born Men and Women: A Review of the 
Scientific Literature, CANADIAN ASS’N FOR ADVANCEMENT WOMEN & SPORT & 
PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 12 (2008), http://www.caaws.ca/e/wp-content/uploads/
2013/02/Devries_lit_review2.pdf (noting that testosterone treatment increases 
muscle cross-sectional area and decreases subcutaneous fat in transgender men, 
though average muscle cross-section area is higher and subcutaneous fat is lower in 
non-transgender men). 
 169. WPATH, supra note 32, at 38 tbl.1B; Hormone Administration, supra no te  
167. 
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other conditions.170  Hormone treatments also impair or reduce 
fertility on a potentially permanent basis.171  Moreover, because 
such treatment is relatively new, many fear that the treatment 
creates risks yet to be discovered.172 
As noted above, surgical interventions are not included in the 
standard of care for transgender youth, except in rare cases.173  As 
a result, most transgender individuals are over the age of eighteen 
before they may feasibly consider surgical options, such as the 
removal of the phallus and testes for transgender women or 
mastectomies for transgender men who experienced female 
puberty.174  Because these interventions have no bearing on a  
 
 
 
person’s athletic ability, it has been persuasively argued that they 
should not be included in policies governing adult participation in 
athletics—let alone in youth participation.175 
B. Hormone Policies Harm Transgender Athletes 
For many transgender individuals, the hormone treatments 
described above are highly desired and even medically necessary 
because they relieve the dissonance transgender people would 
otherwise experience as a result of living in a body discordant with 
their internal sense of gender.  Yet for many reasons, it is 
exclusionary and potentially harmful to condition an adolescent 
transgender athlete’s gender-consonant participation on that 
person’s willingness to undertake such a significant step.  As noted 
above, several athletic associations exclude transgender girls from 
participating in girls’ sports unless they have been on cross-sex 
hormones to suppress and counteract the effects of testosterone for 
at least one year.176  This puts some transgender girls at risk of 
 
 170. WPATH, supra note 32, at 39–40. 
 171. Id. at 100–03. 
 172. See id. at 99–103. 
 173. Id. at 21 (“Genital surgery should not be carried out until (i) patients reach 
the legal age of majority to give consent for medical procedures in a given country, 
and (ii) patients have lived continuously for at least 12 months in the gender ro le  
that is congruent with their gender identity [except that c]hest surgery in [female-
to-male] patients could be carried out earlier, preferably after ample time of living 
in the desired gender role and after one year of testosterone treatment.”). 
 174. See id. at 21; PAT GRIFFIN & HELEN J. CARROLL, ON THE TEAM: EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY FOR TRANSGENDER STUDENT ATHLETES 12–14 (2010) [hereinafter 
GRIFFIN & CARROLL, ON THE TEAM], http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/07/TransgenderStudentAthleteReport.pdf. 
 175. GRIFFIN & CARROLL, ON THE TEAM, supra note 174, at 12. 
 176. See IDAHO POLICY, supra note 37, at 87; MO. POLICY, supra note 38, at 136; 
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temporary exclusion from gender-consonant participation in 
athletics while they satisfy the waiting period requirement.  But 
for others, the requirement operates as a permanent exclusion, 
because such treatment may be unavailable for financial reasons 
or due to the difficulty of finding health-care providers who can 
capably address the medical needs of transgender youth.177  It also 
excludes those who understandably wish to delay until adulthood 
a decision that is accompanied by a potentially permanent 
sacrifice of one’s reproductive capabilities. 
For transgender boys, a hormone policy does not impose a 
barrier to gender-consonant participation, but instead excludes 
them immediately from continuing in girls’ sports.178  And while 
many transgender boys will likely prefer the gender-validating 
opportunity to participate in boys’ sports, others may prefer to 
continue to participate in girls’ sports, despite identifying as male, 
for reasons that could be accommodated by a more flexible policy.  
For example, prior to transition, a transgender boy may have had 
his opportunities limited to girls’ sports, which may be different 
from—and sometimes inferior to—the opportunities made 
available to boys, such as how girls are channeled into softball 
rather than baseball.179  Under these circumstances, a transgender 
boy who was treated as a girl growing up may not have developed 
the skills or ability to qualify for the baseball team.  Thus, for a 
transgender boy in this position, it may not be possible to simply 
switch to baseball, and he may be without a team in either sport.  
In addition, girls are not only steered away from particular sports, 
they also receive fewer athletic opportunities in general and less 
encouragement to develop athletic talent.180  These factors 
 
OKLA. POLICY, supra note 39, at 82–83; OR. POLICY, supra note 40, at 98; WIS. 
POLICY, supra note 41, at 2. 
 177. See Johanna Olson as told to Chris Gardner, Why There’s a Medical Crisis 
for Transgender Youth, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 27, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/why-a-medical-crisis-transgender-818043 
(discussing the dearth of facilities that provide “trans-related [health]services,” and 
stating that “[u]nless a family can get to one of the few existing [health care] 
centers [that provide trans-related services], there’s practically nothing in the  way 
of services available”). 
 178. See IDAHO POLICY, supra note 37, at 87; MO. POLICY, supra note 38, at 136; 
OKLA. POLICY, supra note 39, at 82–83; OR. POLICY, supra note 40, at 98; WIS. 
POLICY, supra note 41, at 2. 
 179. See JENNIFER RING, STOLEN BASES: WHY AMERICAN GIRLS DON’T PLAY 
BASEBALL (2009) (exploring the history of girls’ participation in baseball and the 
social forces which have excluded and continue to exclude girls from playing the 
sport). 
 180. DON SABO & PHIL VELIZ, WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., GO OUT AND PLAY: 
YOUTH SPORTS IN AMERICA 70–71 (2008), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/
ED539976.pdf (discussing the concept of a “‘hidden curriculum’ in physical 
education [which] emphasizes competition and the highest level of physical sk ills 
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contribute to the generalized differences in athleticism between 
boys and girls,181 especially for the aspects of athleticism which 
research suggests are learned skills, not innate talents, such as 
motor skills, coordination, and form.182  For these additional 
reasons, a transgender boy—even one who is transitioning—may 
prefer what could be more skill-appropriate competition among 
girls.  This may be especially true in the early days of treatment 
when his body would be still more physically similar to his other 
female teammates than to the bodies of the boys with whom he 
would then be expected to compete.  As his body changes he may 
soon feel ready to join a boys’ team.  A policy that does not 
automatically exclude transgender boys from girls’ sports provides 
the flexibility needed to enable the athlete and his support system 
to choose when that time should be, reducing the risk that, by 
pursuing a hormone-based transition, he may be excluded from 
athletics altogether. 
For both male and female transgender athletes, participation 
policies based on hormone usage unnecessarily complicate what is 
already a complex and challenging decision about whether and 
when to undergo hormone treatment.  Even without factoring in 
the effect of this decision on their athletic opportunities, 
transgender adolescents face the challenging task of balancing 
their immediate psychological and emotional needs for gender-
affirming treatment with the more distant and remote risk of 
impaired health and fertility.  Adding athletic participation to the 
list of factors puts undue pressure on transgender girls to begin 
treatment and accept those risks, and puts undue pressure on 
transgender boys to delay treatment and forego its benefits.183 
 
rather than promoting health and physical activity for its own sake,” and arguing 
that this focus has “often given boys an advantage because of their larger size  and 
greater level of experience learning sports”); see also Buzuvis, supra note 68, at 38 
(“When it comes to sport, men and boys have enjoyed centuries of preferential 
treatment, including encouragement, validation, opportunity, and incentive, not to  
mention the tailoring of sport to suit men’s physical and socially-constructed 
characteristics.”). 
 181. Buzuvis, supra note 68, at 37–38. 
 182. COLLETTE DOWLING, THE FRAILTY MYTH: REDEFINING THE PHYSICAL 
POTENTIAL OF WOMEN AND GIRLS 62 (2001).  For example, according to one  study, 
second-grade boys and girls threw at the same speed with their non-dominant 
arms, suggesting that practice, rather than innate biological traits, produced boys’ 
superior speed in dominant-arm throws.  Id. at 65 (citing Kathleen Williams et al., 
Environmental Versus Biological Influences on Gender Differences in Overarm 
Throw for Force: Dominant and Nondominant Arm Throws, WOME N I N SPORT &  
PHYSICAL ACTIVITY J., Fall 1996, at 29, 42). 
 183. See Shawn Crincoli, NCAA Transgender Student-Athlete ‘Policy’: Analysis,  
WORLD SPORTS L. REP., Nov. 2011, at 9, 11, http://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1467&context=scholarlyworks (criticizing “the [NCAA’s] 
adoption of a hormone-based approach for eligibility of university-aged trans 
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C. Hormone Policies and Other Policies That Permit 
Exclusion Are Not Necessary to Preserve the Athletic 
Experience of Non-Transgender Participants 
Like hormone policies, which risk excluding transgender 
athletes who are not planning to or who are not ready for a 
hormone-assisted transition, policies that permit excluding 
transgender athletes on the basis of perceived “gender related 
advantages” operate to permit some, but not all, gender-consonant 
participation.  Yet, while some believe that hormone policies and 
policies with caveats for gender-related advantages are necessary 
to ensure the safety and fairness of girls’ sports,184 these objectives  
 
are illusory in sport and cannot be attained by regulating the 
testosterone levels or other physical characteristics of transgender 
participants.185 
While athletic opportunities tend to be segregated by sex, 
within those categories, society tolerates a diverse range of body 
types and athletic talent.186  By virtue of being inclusive, sports 
are never played on a level field.  No state athletic associations 
exclude, for example, non-transgender girls who are of an above-
average height, even though height is believed to contribute an 
athletic advantage in many sports.  Nor do they typically prohibit 
freshmen, who may be as young as fourteen, from competing with 
and against seniors, even though a four-year age difference may 
create competitive advantages resulting from physical maturity 
and increased experience.  Even the most elite athletic contests, 
let alone those in high school and youth sports, feel no need to 
screen and sort athletes according to whether or not they possess 
genes that clearly enhance traits like endurance and blood 
oxygen.187  High school athletes who received athletic training 
early in life, who compete in their sport year-round instead of 
 
women, without regard for the incentives this may create for young athletes to rush 
to begin cross-sex hormone treatment to participate in sport (with serious 
consequences, including though not limited to—infertility)”). 
 184. See e.g., Reist, supra note 42 (reporting that “[t]he Nebraska School 
Activities Association’s proposed policy on transgender students’ participation in 
high school sports would require at least a year of hormone therapy fo r students 
transitioning from male to female . . . because of concerns about the competitive 
advantage a transgender female athlete might have over biologically female 
opponents,” and noting that opponents of the policy expressed concern that “any 
transgender policy . . . would be confusing to children and cause safety concerns 
because of the size differences between boys and girls”). 
 185. Devries, supra note 168, at 14. 
 186. Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra note 106 at 274, 287. 
 187. Jon Bardin, Is Gene Doping Coming to the Olympics?, L.A. TIMES (July 18, 
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/18/science/la-sci-sn-is-gene-doping-
coming-to-the-olympics-20120718. 
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seasonally, and who have access to resources like private coaching, 
have clear  competitive advantages, and these factors are not a 
proposed basis for excluding athletes for the sake of a level playing 
field.  Thus, whatever physical or athletic advantage an un-
transitioned transgender girl or a transitioning transgender boy 
may have—“may” being the appropriate word, since plenty of 
overlap exists between male and female categories when it comes 
to size, strength, and other facets of athleticism188—it is just one 
manner of advantage among countless others. 
In addition to tolerating diversity within sex categories, sport 
organizers sometimes even allow girls and boys to compete with 
and against each other, adding the diversity of gender to the mix.  
For example, some states permit or require schools to allow non-
transgender boys to play on girls’ teams, when the boy would not 
otherwise have an opportunity to compete in that sport.189  In field 
hockey, for example, athletic associations and conferences 
sometimes permit boys to play on girls’ teams because schools 
generally do not offer separate field hockey teams for boys.190  In 
light of such policies, allowing a transgender girl to participate 
presents an even more compelling case for inclusion because she is 
female in the way that matters most:  her gender identity.  If girls’ 
sports can accommodate a non-transgender boy in the interest of 
ensuring that he has adequate access to athletic opportunities, a 
transgender girl can receive such accommodation as well. 
Excluding an un-transitioned transgender girl or a 
transitioning transgender boy from a girls’ sport because of 
 
 188. Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra note 106 at 274, 287; see also 
Shalender Bashin et al., Proof of the Effect of Testosterone on Skeletal Muscle ,  170 
J. ENDOCRINOLOGY 27, 27, 34 (2001), http://joe.endocrinology-
journals.org/content/170/1/27.full.pdf (“There is agreement that testosterone 
supplementation increases muscle mass and maximal voluntary strength in a 
variety of clinical and experimental paradigms, but we do not know whether 
testosterone improves athletic performance or health-related outcomes . . . . It is 
fair to state that unequivocal improvements [resulting from testosterone] in 
measures of athletic performance have not been demonstrated in any study.”) 
(citations omitted)). 
 189. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 393 N.E.2d 284, 
289 (Mass. 1979) (requiring the Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association 
to permit boys on girls’ teams when there is not a boys’ team in that sport). 
 190. Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(permitting a boy’s participation on a girls’ field hockey team pending a finding by 
the district court that field hockey is not a contact sport for purposes of Title IX 
regulation that otherwise permits cross-sex tryouts); Associated Press, New York 
Boy Can Play Field Hockey , ESPN (May 15, 2012), http://espn.go.com/new-
york/story/_/id/7933109/new-york-boy-keeling-pilaro-play-girls-field-hockey-team; 
Todd C. Frankel, What To Do When a Eureka Boy Wants To Play a ‘Girls Sp ort ’? ,  
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/
local/education/what-to-do-when-a-eureka-boy-wants-to-play/article_4fbe1d7a-6083-
50dc-983d-4fa16602c096.html. 
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concerns about testosterone will not make sports “fair,” when 
variations in size, strength, talent, and experience still operate to 
place some competitors at an advantage over others.  Nor will her 
presence in the game automatically render it unfair, since it is 
equally possible that the other competitors have compensatory 
advantages of their own, like the basketball player who is taller 
than average, the swimmer with a massive wingspan, and the 
soccer player whose family could afford to send her to sports camps 
in the summer. 
The only eligibility criteria that a policy should include is 
whether the athlete’s stated gender identity is “bona fide,” as the 
Massachusetts and Connecticut athletic associations’ policies 
say.191  This criterion provides the legal basis on which to 
distinguish between a transgender girl and the possibility, 
however remote, of a boy pretending to be a girl in order to 
participate in girls’ sports.192  Just as policies should not exclude 
transgender athletes based on hormone status, they should not 
contain language expressly or impliedly permitting school or 
association officials to exclude athletes for reasons related to 
safety and competitive equity193 or for vaguely stated “[g]ender 
identity related advantages.”194  Like hormone policies, these 
exclusions uniquely and unfairly target transgender students for 
exclusion based on criteria that could just as easily be present in 
other non-transgender athletes.  The policies permit 
administrators to exercise boundless discretion in determining an 
athlete’s eligibility and do nothing to prevent the influence of bias 
and stereotypes on the decision at hand.195 
 
 191. CONN. POLICY, supra note 59, at 56; MASS. POLICY,  supra note 60. 
 192. Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra note 106, at 289.  Despite prevailing 
social anxiety about men masquerading as women for nefarious sport purposes, 
there are almost no actual examples of this occurring in real life.  The only 
documented example is that of Hermann Ratjen, whom the Nazis forced to disguise 
himself as a woman and compete for Germany in the women’s high jump in the 
1936 Olympics (he placed fourth).  Christopher Hilton, Amazing Tale of Man Called 
Hermann Who Finished Fourth in Women’s High Jump , INDEPENDENT (July 19, 
2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/general/athletics/amazing-tale-of -man-
called-hermann-who-finished-fourth-in-womens-high-jump-872322.html.  
Relatedly, while there has been suspicion that female Olympic athletes have taken 
testosterone for an athletic advantage, these cases also appear to have resulted 
from the compulsory practices of sinister Cold War regimes.  See Sheila L. 
Cavanaugh & Heather Sykes, Transsexual Bodies at the Olympics: The 
International Olympic Committee’s Policy on Transsexual Athletes at the 2004 
Athens Summer Games, 12 BODY & SOC’Y 75, 83 (2006). 
 193. See ME. POLICY, supra note 47, at 19; N.J. POLICY, supra note 48, at 84. 
 194. See ILL. POLICY, supra note 49, at 120; KAN. POLICY, supra note 50, at 1. 
 195. For example, an administrator may be tempted to exclude a transgender 
girl who is taller than the average height for non-transgender girls, having 
concluded that her height is a gender-related advantage.  But height is a 
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In sum, state athletic associations and other entities that 
regulate youth sports should not condition gender-consonant 
participation on an athlete’s status with cross-sex hormones or 
perception of gender-related advantages.  Especially where 
athletic opportunities are part of an institution’s educational 
mission, eliminating actual barriers to participation should rightly 
take priority over vague and often stereotype-based assumptions 
about gender and competitive advantages. 
 
D. Hormone Policies and Other Gender-Consonant Policies 
with Restrictions and Limitations Conflict with Title IX 
and Anti-Discrimination Laws in Many States 
The arguments laid out above against birth certificate 
policies—that by foreclosing gender-consonant participation, they 
violate transgender athletes’ rights under Title IX and state anti-
discrimination laws196—apply with similar force to policies that 
only permit gender-consonant participation by those athletes who 
have undergone treatment with cross-sex hormones, or who 
otherwise exhibit no “gender-related advantages” or do not 
threaten competitive equity or safety.  The apparent rationale 
behind conditions and limitations like these is to ensure that non-
transgender athletes are not disadvantaged or placed in danger by 
competing with or against individuals whose bodies may be 
different as a result of their transgender status. 
However, this rationale is inconsistently applied.  Thus, 
courts can legally discount such arguments as pretext for 
discrimination against transgender athletes, and, as such, as 
violating Title IX and/or the Equal Protection Clause, as well as 
any state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender 
identity.197  For example, athletic associations in Illinois and 
Kansas permit exclusion of transgender athletes with “gender-
related advantages,” in an apparent effort to promote competitive 
equity and safety.198  It is conceivable that an association would 
consider a transgender girl who is taller than average to have a 
gender-related advantage because boys are generally taller than 
girls.  However, those associations do not restrict the participation 
 
generalized gender difference, not a categorical one.  Some natal females are talle r 
than some natal males.  There is no way for an administrator to isolate the 
athlete’s natal sex as the cause in fact of her tallness, since the possibility that even 
if she had been born a non-transgender female she would still be tall, cannot be 
ruled out. 
 196. See supra Part II.B. 
 197. See supra Part II.B. 
 198. ILL. POLICY, supra note 49, at 120; KAN. POLICY, supra note 50, at 1. 
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of other tall girls, even though they would pose the same threat to 
competitive equity and safety.199  Therefore, the policy permits 
excluding a transgender girl for no other reason than that she is 
transgender.  This is both sex discrimination and discrimination 
on the basis of gender identity. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that regulators directly 
considering the applicability of gender-identity nondiscrimination 
statutes to athletics have found no reason to condition transgender 
students’ rights to gender-consonant access or participation on 
whether or not they have undergone a hormonal transition or have 
physical characteristics that are atypical for their affirmed gender.  
For example, after legislatures in Massachusetts and Connecticut 
added gender identity to state laws prohibiting discrimination in 
education, state agencies promptly issued regulatory guidance 
clarifying that schools must permit gender-consonant athletic 
participation in all cases.200  Limitations and conditions on gender-
consonant participation are therefore most vulnerable in states 
with similar discrimination statutes, including those whose 
athletic associations permit schools to exclude transgender 
athletes from gender-consonant participation in the name of 
competitive equity and safety (Maine201 and New Jersey202), 
because of “gender-related advantages” (Illinois203), and in the 
absence of treatment with cross-sex hormones (Oregon204). 
IV. Maximizing Inclusivity of Gender-Consonant Policies 
Thus far, this Article has established that polices excluding 
or otherwise limiting transgender athletes from gender-consonant 
participation are harmful to transgender individuals, inconsistent 
with prevailing medical understandings of gender identity, 
unnecessary for purposes of competitive equity and other 
purported rationales, and invalid as a matter of civil rights law.  
This Part turns to gender-consonant policies and suggests ways 
they can be improved to maximize the inclusion they seek to 
achieve. 
 
 199. See ILL. POLICY, supra note 49; KAN. POLICY, supra note 50. 
 200. CONN. SAFE SCH. COAL., supra note 144, at 8–9; MASS. DEP’T OF 
ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 144, at 10. 
 201. ME. POLICY, supra note 47, at 19. 
 202. N.J. POLICY, supra note 48, at 83–84. 
 203. ILL. POLICY, supra note 49, at 120. 
 204. OR. POLICY, supra note 40, at 98. 
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A. Gender-Consonant Policies Should Minimize Procedural 
Obstacles to Participation 
First, gender-consonant participation policies should seek to 
minimize the procedural barriers to participation that could deter 
transgender youth from pursuing athletic opportunities.  Athletic 
associations and youth sports programs may have valid reasons to 
incorporate a process for verifying a transgender student’s 
affirmed gender-identity claim into their gender-consonant policy.  
Such processes reassure stakeholders that there is a forum in 
which to address any abuse of the policy, should it occur.  
However, the timeline of such processes, how they are initiated, 
and the evidentiary burdens they place on athletes are all aspects 
that policymakers should consider in seeking to eliminate 
unnecessary procedural barriers to participation. 
Existing gender-consonant policies provide different 
processes for gender identity verification.  Virginia’s 
interscholastic athletic association,205 as well as those in Maine206 
and Illinois,207 requires transgender athletes to undergo a gender-
identity verification process as a prerequisite to gender-consonant 
participation.  Other gender-consonant participation policies, such 
as Washington state’s, hold off on the verification process until 
“questions arise.”208  Virginia’s front-loaded process requires 
multiple levels of review to approve the student’s request before 
the student can participate;209 however, Washington’s policy 
permits but does not require appellate review.210  These two facets 
of Virginia’s policy threaten to deter transgender athletes, who 
may be intimidated by the procedural hurdles they are required to 
overcome, from participating. Virginia’s policy essentially puts 
transgender athletes in the position of having to defend their 
requests, whereas Washington’s policy and others like it extend a 
presumption of validity to athletes’ stated gender identities.  For 
this reason, in practice, Virginia’s policy is more likely than 
Washington’s to deter the very participation permitted by the 
policy. 
A third procedure for gender-identity verification  can be seen 
in those athletic association policies that defer to school officials’ 
conclusions.  For example, athletic associations in 
 
 205. VA. POLICY, supra note 66, at 108–10. 
 206. ME. POLICY, supra note 47, at 19. 
 207. ILL. POLICY, supra note 49, at 119–20. 
 208. WASH. POLICY, supra note 67, at 31–32. 
 209. VA. POLICY, supra note 66, at 108–110. 
 210. WASH. POLICY, supra note 67, at 31–32. 
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Massachusetts211 and Connecticut,212 do not have  gender identity 
committees that verify conclusions made by school officials as to 
whether students’ gender-identities claims are valid.  This 
decentralized process can benefit transgender students by 
minimizing procedural barriers to participation.  However, the 
downside of such deference is that the athletic association is 
unable to provide recourse to a transgender student whose 
principal or athletic director does not support gender-consonant 
participation.  While this is not as much a concern in 
Massachusetts and Connecticut because those states clearly 
express a student’s enforceable right to gender-consonant 
participation as a matter of state law,213 in other states where that 
clarity has not yet been attained, a transgender student might 
need an opportunity to appeal the gender-identity verification 
process to the athletic association level. 
Gender-identity verification processes may also differ 
through the evidentiary requirements that they may impose on 
students.  For example, the Virginia athletic association’s policy is 
unique among gender-consonant policies in requiring the student 
to present evidence from a medical provider corroborating the 
student’s asserted gender identity.214  This evidence may be 
difficult for some students to obtain because of the high cost and 
limited availability of transgender-friendly health care.215  
Moreover, medical corroboration is unnecessary because a gender-
consonant policy focuses the decision-maker’s inquiry on whether 
or not the student’s request was made in good faith.  Many 
individuals who are not medical providers can vouch for a 
student’s character; thus, a better policy approach in the event of a 
challenge is to permit the student to present corroborating 
evidence in the form of statements from anyone who knows the 
student well—including medical providers, but also people like 
parents, teachers, pastors, and social workers. 
B. Gender-Consonant Policies Should Address Other 
Aspects of Inclusion 
Several state interscholastic athletic associations include in 
their policies a set of guidelines or “areas of awareness” that 
suggest other ways that member schools should support gender-
 
 211. See MASS. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 144. 
 212. See CONN. SAFE SCH. COAL., supra note 144. 
 213. See supra Part III.D. 
 214. VA. POLICY, supra note 66, at 108–10. 
 215. See Olson, supra note 177. 
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consonant participation.216  Typical examples include “us[ing] 
correct names/pronouns according to the student’s gender 
identity,”217 “permit[ting] the student to dress according to gender 
identity,”218 and providing “gender appropriate restroom 
accessibility”219 and reasonably “accommodat[ing] equitable locker 
room accessibility.”220  Although these guidelines are collateral to 
the issue of one’s eligibility to play, they are necessary to ensure 
that an athlete feels safe and comfortable exercising their right to 
participate as provided in the policy.  By including guidelines like 
these in their policies, state interscholastic athletic associations 
help raise member schools’ awareness about the legal obligations 
they already face under Title IX and, possibly, state law.221 
V. Conclusion: An Annotated Model Policy 
In order to ensure that transgender youth and adolescents 
have the opportunity to participate in athletics as “who they really 
are,” athletic associations and national governing bodies of sport 
should permit gender-consonant participation without conditions 
or limitations, while also minimizing whatever process might be 
necessary to validate the student’s affirmed gender identity.  To 
that end, this Article now concludes with a proposed model policy 
geared towards athletic associations that want to avoid the 
harmful and illegal aspects of the policies discussed in Parts II and 
III and that want to maximize inclusion in the manner proposed in 
Part IV.  Explanatory language provided in the footnotes is meant 
to help the reader, not to be included in the policy as adopted. 
 
PHILOSOPHY OF GENDER IDENTITY PARTICIPATION222 
 
 216. See COLO. HIGH SCH. ACTIVITIES ASS’N, TRANSGENDER PROCEDURE AND 
POLICY (2013) [hereinafter COLO. POLICY], http://media.wix.com/ugd/
2bc3fc_eeb01ddea851116f11c35760e11424e5.pdf; Reist, supra note 42 (outlining 
Nebraska’s proposed policy). 
 217. COLO. POLICY, supra note 216, at 3. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the Department of Education’s position 
that Title IX requires schools to permit transgender students to use sex-segregated 
facilities, like locker rooms, consistent with their gender identities); see also Letter 
from Adele Rapport, supra note 136 (discussing a school district’s violation of  Title  
IX for excluding a student from participation and generally treating the student 
differently on the basis of sex). 
 222. It can be helpful for a policy to articulate an overarching principle of 
inclusion to create context for readers to understand the policy.  However, such 
statements should appear under their own heading in order to be clearly delineated 
from the policy itself.  Such statements should not include language that the 
policymakers do not want to be literally construed as a policy requirement.  The 
378 Law and Inequality [Vol. 34:341 
The [state athletic association] believes that athletic 
participation is valuable to students’ physical, intellectual, social, 
and character development and, accordingly, we value inclusion.  
Guided by this value, our policy permits transgender students’ 
athletic participation in a manner consistent with each student’s 
gender identity.223 
 
 
POLICY PERMITTING GENDER IDENTITY-BASED 
PARTICIPATION 
All students should have the opportunity to participate in [state 
athletic association] activities in a manner that is consistent with 
their gender identity, irrespective of the gender listed on a 
student’s records and without prior medical or mental health care.  
 
1. Eligibility to participate.  A student has the right to 
participate in athletics in a manner consistent with the sex listed 
on that student’s school records.224  A student whose gender 
identity is different than the sex listed on the student’s 
registration records may participate in a manner consistent with 
the student’s gender identity in accordance with the policy 
below.225  
 
2. Notice to the school.  The student and/or parents shall 
contact the school administrator or athletic director indicating 
that the student has a gender identity different from the sex listed 
 
ambiguity of Maryland’s policy, see supra text accompanying notes 50, 51, could 
have been avoided by either omitting background information that informed the 
policy or clearly identifying the information as background and not policy. 
 223. Some existing athletic association policies include a definition section.  This 
model policy, by contrast, strives to avoid terms for which definitions are needed.  If 
policymakers prefer to include a list of defined terms, it is recommended to limit 
that list to words or concepts that are included in the policy itself. 
 224. Depending on state law and school district policy, some transgender 
students may have had the opportunity to enroll according to their affirmed gender 
or to have updated school records to include their correct gender marker.  This 
sentence secures the rights of such transgender students to participate in athle tics 
according to the gender identity already reflected in their school records. 
For transgender students whose gender identity differs from the  se x listed in  
their school records, this sentence establishes their right to participate in athle tics 
according to their birth-assigned sex, should they decide that such participation is 
a better fit for them.  See supra Part III.B. (discussing the reasons transgender 
boys might wish to remain in girls’ sports). 
 225. School records are often consistent with birth records because it is common 
for school districts to require students to present birth certificates as part of the 
enrollment process.  This sentence secures the right of transgender students to 
participate in athletics according to their gender identities, even if their identitie s 
differ from the gender indicated on school records. 
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on the student’s school registration records, and that the student 
desires to participate in activities in a manner consistent with the 
student’s gender identity.226 
 
a. Note: a student is presumed eligible to participate in 
[state athletic association] activities in a manner 
consistent with the student’s school registration records, 
even if that differs from the sex assigned at birth.  Such 
a student is not required to provide notice under this 
subpart.227  
 
3. Notice to the [state athletic association].  Upon receiving 
notice under subpart 1, a school administrator should inform the 
[state athletic association] [insert specific person’s title] of the 
student’s intent to participate in activities in a manner consistent 
with the student’s gender identity, as opposed to the sex listed on 
the student’s school registration records.228 
 
4. Determination proceeding.  Should the [state athletic 
association] receive a timely petition from a member institution 
challenging a student’s participation in a sex-segregated activity 
consistent with the student’s gender identity, or, although not 
required, a student seeks to preemptively confirm that student’s 
eligibility, the [state athletic association] will review that student’s 
eligibility for participation in accordance with the procedure set 
forth below229: 
 
 226. The requirement that a transgender student provide notice of the student’s 
intent to engage in gender-consonant athletic participation is intended to he lp the  
student by providing school officials with the relevant information required to 
ensure that the student’s right is secured.  In the interest of minimizing 
participation barriers, policies should not impose additional requirements beyond 
notice. 
 227. This is an explanatory note clarifying that the notice requirement in the 
prior sentence only applies to those transgender students whose gender identity is 
not already reflected in school records.  For transgender students whose gender 
identities are reflected on school records, a requirement to provide notice at the 
outset of athletic participation is duplicative of the process they went through to 
change their gender marker on school records, and thus redundant. 
 228. The requirement that school officials provide notice to the state 
interscholastic athletic association is designed to help the student whose gender-
consonant participation may raise questions or generate complaints directed at 
association officials. 
 229. A determination proceeding should not be a threshold requirement for 
transgender student’s gender-consonant participation because of the potential 
chilling effect that it may have on participation.  However, in the event that a 
student’s participation is disputed, it is important for a policy to include clear steps 
about how to resolve such a dispute.  Additionally, policies should permit a 
transgender student to seek a preemptive determination hearing.  Students may 
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a. The [state athletic association] will convene an eligibility 
committee specifically established to hear gender 
identity appeals.  The Gender Identity Eligibility 
Committee230 will be comprised of a minimum of three of 
the following persons, one of whom must be from the 
physician or mental health profession category:  
 
i. Physician with experience working with youth 
whose gender identity differs from the sex they 
were assigned at birth and who is familiar with 
the World Professional Association for 
Transgender Health (WPATH) Standards of 
Care and other standard-setting documents; 
 
ii. Licensed mental health provider with 
experience working with youth whose gender 
identity differs from the sex they were assigned 
at birth and who is familiar with the World 
Professional Association for Transgender 
Health (WPATH) Standards of Care and other 
standard-setting documents; 
 
iii. School administrator from a non-appealing 
school; 
 
iv. [State athletic association] staff member; 
 
v. Gender-affirming advocate familiar with issues 
affecting youth whose gender identity differs 
from the sex they were assigned at birth.231 
 
 
want to exercise this option if they wish to preempt any anticipated negative 
responses to their participation. 
 230. The opportunity to appeal to a committee can protect a student’s 
opportunity to participate in the event the student receives an unfavorable 
determination from the school administrator or athletic director.  While not 
necessary in states that already provide an enforceable right to gender-consonant 
participation, this procedural safeguard is warranted elsewhere. 
 231. This list of possible committee members is already common to many gender-
consonant participation policies.  See supra note 71 and accompanying text 
(describing Washington state’s policy).  Committee members should include a 
medical or mental health care provider as a means of ensuring that the legitimacy 
of a transgender experience is taken into consideration.  Their inclusion on the 
committee also helps ensure that its decision in favor of the student is credible  to  
those who initiated the challenge. 
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b. The committee shall conduct a hearing as expeditiously 
as possible, but no later than five (5) school business 
days prior to the first full interscholastic contest that is 
the subject of the petition.  In the case of an emergency, 
the hearing shall be held within a reasonable time after 
the petition challenging a student’s eligibility has been 
filed.232 
 
c. The student shall have the opportunity to provide the 
committee with the following documentation: 
 
i. Current transcript and school registration 
information; 
 
ii. Documentation of the student’s consistent 
gender identification (e.g., affirmed written 
statements from the student and/or the 
student’s parent(s)/guardian(s) and/or health-
care provider(s)); and 
 
iii. Any other pertinent documentation or 
information.233 
 
d. If the Gender Identity Eligibility Committee finds that 
the student’s gender identity is sincere, i.e., is not 
motivated by an improper purpose, then the student 
shall be declared eligible to continue participating in sex-
segregated activities consistent with the student’s 
gender identity.234  This determination of eligibility will 
be in force for the duration of the student’s participation 
 
 232. Because a determination proceeding will raise disruptive uncertainty about 
the student’s continued participation, it is important that the process conclude as 
quickly as possible. 
 233. Not all transgender students have access to gender-affirming medical care .  
Accordingly, a student should not be required, but should be permitted, to  submit 
evidence from a medical provider.  Moreover, a medical provider does not have a 
unique insight into the issue to be determined by the committee, which is whether 
a student’s assertion of gender identity is sincere.  Persuasive evidence that the 
student is acting in good faith can come from other individuals who know the 
student well. 
 234. Here, the policy makes clear that the only inquiry before the committee is 
whether the student’s asserted gender identity is sincere.  The committee is not 
permitted to consider or make exceptions based on considerations like safety or 
competitive advantage, for the reasons discussed above.  See supra Part III.C 
(arguing that the policies seeking to permit exclusions for safety and competitive  
reasons are not justified for their stated purposes). 
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and does not need to be renewed every sports season.235 
 
e. Either the student or the petitioner may appeal an 
adverse outcome.  The appealing party must file a notice 
of appeal with the Executive Director of the [state 
athletic association] within ten (10) school business days 
following the date of the written decision of the Gender 
Identity Eligibility Committee.  Upon receiving an 
appeal, the Executive Director will schedule a hearing to 
commence within ten (10) school business days following 
the date of receipt of the written notice of appeal.  
Written notice of the time and place of the hearing shall 
be delivered to all parties in person or by certified mail, 
with return receipt requested, no later than five (5) 
school business days prior to the date of the hearing.236 
 
5. Confidentiality.  With the exception of the notice required 
in subpart 2 of this policy and the hearing allowed in subpart 3, 
students affected by this policy have the right to confidentiality in 
all matters governed by this policy.  School administrators and 
[state athletic association] officials shall respect this 
confidentiality unless and to whatever extent it might be waived 
by the student.237 
 
ADDITIONAL GUIDELINES.238 
 
The [state athletic association] endorses the following 
guidelines to ensure the nondiscriminatory treatment of 
transgender students participating in [state athletic association] 
activities.239 
 
 235. By ensuring that the committee’s determination is durable, this language 
eliminates the threat of reduced participation caused by forcing a student to go 
through the process again. 
 236. A right to appeal allows for the opportunity to correct an erroneous 
determination made by the committee.  Alternatively, when a committee’s 
determination is upheld, the appellate process lends credibility to the 
determination. 
 237. Confidentiality—subject to the necessary exceptions for complying with the  
notice requirement and the possibility of a determination proceeding—helps 
minimize the risk that the threat of widespread disclosure would operate as an 
obstacle to participation. 
 238. These guidelines are adapted from the NCAA.  See GRIFFIN & CARROLL, 
NCAA INCLUSION, supra note 35, at 20–21.  While several existing athletic 
association policies offer guidance on these topics as well, the NCAA’s language 
most clearly conveys the best practice standard. 
 239. This policy presents these additional considerations as guidelines out of 
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1. Changing Areas, Toilets, Showers.  A transgender 
student-athlete should be able to use the locker room, shower, and 
toilet facilities in accordance with the student’s gender identity.  
Every locker room should have some private, enclosed changing 
areas, showers, and toilets for use by any athlete who desires 
them.  When requested by a transgender student-athlete, schools 
should provide private and separate changing, showering, and 
toilet facilities for the student’s use, but transgender students 
should not be required to use separate facilities.240 
 
2. Hotel Rooms.  Transgender student-athletes generally 
should be assigned to share hotel rooms based on their gender 
identity, with a recognition that any student who needs extra 
privacy should be accommodated whenever possible. 
 
3. Language.  Preferred names and pronouns.  A 
transgender student may prefer a name and gender pronouns that 
are different from what may be indicated by the student’s school 
records.  Coaches, administrators, and officials shall make every 
reasonable effort to honor that student’s preferred name and 
pronouns and to ensure that the student’s name and pronoun 
preferences are respected by others including teammates, 
opponents, fans, volunteers, announcers, etc.  This guideline 
applies not only for transgender students who seek to participate 
in state athletic association activities in a manner consistent with 
their gender identity, but also to those whose participation is 
consistent with the sex on their school records. 
 
4. Dress codes and team uniforms.  All team members 
should have access to uniforms that are appropriate for their sport 
and that they feel comfortable wearing.  No student should be 
required to wear a gendered uniform that conflicts with the 
student’s gender identity.  Dress codes for athletic teams when 
traveling or during a game day at school should be gender-neutral. 
(For example, instead of requiring a girls’ or women’s team to wear 
 
recognition for the increased enforcement burden on state athletic associations that 
would result if these rules were mandatory.  Moreover, some of these guidelines are 
consistent with requirements under Title IX and state law, so a school that does not 
adhere to these guidelines risks the possibility of litigation and government 
enforcement. 
 240. The Department of Education takes the position that Title IX requires 
schools to permit transgender students to use sex-segregated facilities like  lo cker 
rooms consistent with their gender identities.  See Letter from Adele Rapport, 
supra note 136. 
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dresses or skirts, ask that team members wear dresses or slacks 
that are clean, neat, well cared for and appropriately “dressy” for 
representing their school and team.) 
 
5. Competition at Another School.  Without violating a 
transgender student’s confidentiality or privacy, school leaders, 
athletic directors, and coaches should communicate with their 
counterparts at other schools prior to competitions in which a 
transgender athlete is participating to discuss expectations for 
treatment of transgender student-athletes on and off the field, 
including to ensure that the student will have access to 
appropriate changing, showering, and/or bathroom facilities, and 
to request the use of preferred names and pronouns by coaches, 
opponents, officials, announcers, fans, and media. 
 
